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Abstract
Over the past decade, the United States Supreme Court increasingly recognized
that juvenile offenders deserve more individualized constitutional protections within
the criminal justice system. In Roper, Graham, and Miller, the Court held that
juveniles are different than adults in maturity, susceptibility to outside pressures, and
potential for reform. Therefore, constitutionally under the Eighth Amendment, juvenile
offenders cannot be punished in the same manner as adult offenders. In J.D.B., the
Court went beyond the Eighth Amendment and held that increased vulnerability to
outside pressures merits granting juveniles greater Fifth Amendment protections during
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governmental interrogations. These holdings came at the tail end of the “get tough” on
crime era, a period in which states turned towards punishing juveniles, and away from
rehabilitating them.
One policy trend during that era, employed by California and dozens of other
states, was enacting statutes either sending juvenile cases directly to the adult criminal
system or allowing prosecutors to directly file juvenile cases in the adult criminal system
via prosecutorial waiver. Both routes deprive juveniles of a fitness hearing before a
judicial officer. A fitness hearing allows the juvenile to present evidence supporting
whether refuge in juvenile court is proper or whether they must be siphoned into the
adult criminal system.
Existing scholarship on the juvenile to adult court waiver process focuses on
punishment and rehabilitation theories in the juvenile context. These theories only
hint at policy directions criminal justice systems should follow without coming right
out and saying it—transferring a juvenile into the adult criminal system without
a fitness hearing violates the juvenile’s basic due process rights. Part I of this article
discusses a brief history of the juvenile court system, its foundation on rehabilitative
principles, its movement towards punishment, and describes the current adult court
transfer procedures. Part II discusses the recent United States Supreme Court holdings
mentioned earlier and presents further scientific research on the distinction between
juveniles and adults. Finally, Part III argues that the holdings of the Supreme Court
and the bodies of scientific research they rest upon, considered against the structure and
purpose of the juvenile court system, validate the liberty interest of juveniles in juvenile
court adjudication. Based on this liberty interest, the Supreme Court should do what it
had the opportunity to do forty years ago: hold that juveniles suffer such a grievous loss
when transferred to the adult criminal system, that doing so without proper protection
violates due process.
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Introduction
“Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled
discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a
poor substitute for principle and procedure.”1
The United States juvenile court system focuses primarily on rehabilitation
and controlling the stigmatization and liberty constraints accompanying criminal
adjudications,2 a focus lacking in the adult criminal system.3 Currently, after a
1

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).

2

See infra Part I.A.

3

See infra Part III.B.4.
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juvenile is charged with a crime, his case can be transferred out of the juvenile
courts and into the adult criminal justice system through either judicial waiver,
legislative waiver, mandatory judicial waiver, or prosecutorial waiver.4 Only
judicial waiver, however, allows the juvenile an opportunity to be heard on the
issue of transfer.5 As such, only this method complies with the United States
Constitution’s Due Process Clause.6 The other methods fail to adequately protect
a juvenile’s liberty interest in juvenile court adjudication, and thus violate his
procedural due process rights.7
This article develops this argument in three parts. Part I discusses a brief
history of the juvenile court system, its foundation on rehabilitative principles and
movement towards punishment, then concludes by describing the current adult
court transfer procedures.8 Part II then elaborates on the recent Supreme Court
holdings validating the differences between juvenile and adult offenders, and the
scientific studies they rest upon.9 Finally, Part III argues that these Supreme Court
holdings and the bodies of scientific research they rest upon, considered against
the structure and purpose of the juvenile court system, validate the liberty interest
of juveniles in juvenile court adjudications.10 Based on this liberty interest, the
Supreme Court should do what it had the opportunity to do forty years ago: hold
that juveniles suffer such a grievous loss when transferred to the adult criminal
system, that doing so without proper protection violates due process. To provide
some history and background on the issue, however, this article begins with the
latest United States Supreme Court decision directly addressing the issue, and the
story of Morris A. Kent.
***
Kent was sixteen years old in 1961 when he was arrested for suspicion of
burglary and rape, and subsequently confessed after approximately seven hours
of interrogation.11 Due to his age, the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Court Act
granted the Juvenile Court “exclusive jurisdiction.”12 Kent was held in a receiving

4

See infra Parts I.B–C.

5

See infra Parts I.B–C.

6

See infra Part III.

7

See infra Part III.

8

See infra Part I.

9

See infra Part II.

10

See infra Part III.

11

See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 544 (1966).

12

In 1961, the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Court Act stated:
Children,—Except as herein otherwise provided, the court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction of all cases and in proceedings: (a). Concerning any child coming
within the terms and provisions of this subchapter. (b). Concerning any person under
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home for children for almost a week without an arraignment or probable cause
hearing.13 At the time, the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Court Act provided
that the juvenile court could only waive its exclusive jurisdiction over a child
and transfer jurisdiction to the District Court after a judge conducted a “full
investigation.”14 Kent’s attorney informed the Juvenile Court of his opposition to
any such waiver.15
Without holding a hearing or ruling on any motions submitted by Kent,
the juvenile court judge “entered an order reciting that after ‘full investigation, I
do hereby waive’ jurisdiction of petitioner and directing that he be ‘held for trial
for (the alleged) offenses under the regular procedure of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia.’”16 The juvenile court judge made no findings and
recited no reasons for his decision waiving jurisdiction.17 Following trial, Kent was
sentenced to prison for thirty to ninety years.18
The United States Supreme Court held that the full investigation requirement
of the statute “does not permit the Juvenile Court to determine in isolation
and without the participation or any representation of the child the ‘critically
important ’ question whether a child will be deprived of the special protections
and provisions of the Juvenile Court Act.”19 The Court stated that “there is no
place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences
without ceremony—without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel,

21 years of age charged with having violated any law, or violated any ordinance or
regulation of the District of Columbia, prior to having become 18 years of age, subject
to appropriate statutes of limitation . . . .
D.C. Code § 11-907 (1961).
13
14

See Kent, 383 U.S. at 544–45.
In 1961, the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Court Act stated:
If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with an offense which would amount
to a felony in the case of an adult, or any child charged with an offense which if
committed by an adult is punishable by death or life imprisonment, the judge may,
after full investigation, waive jurisdiction and order such child held for trial under
the regular procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of such offense if
committed by an adult; or such other court may exercise the powers conferred upon
the Juvenile court in this subchapter in conducting and disposing of such cases.

D.C. Code § 11-914 (1961) (emphasis added). In 1959, the District of Columbia United States
Court of Appeals held that a “full investigation” required at minimum an informal hearing. See
United States v. Dickerson, 271 F.2d 487, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
15

See Kent, 383 U.S. at 544.

16

Id. at 546.

17

Id.

18

Id. at 550.

19

Id. at 553 (emphasis added).
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without a statement of reasons.”20 Furthermore, “[i]t would be extraordinary if
society’s special concern for children, as reflected in the District of Columbia’s
Juvenile Court Act, permitted this procedure.”21
Following the Kent decision Congress amended the Juvenile Court Act. The
amendment empowered United States Attorneys to waive certain juvenile cases
out of the juvenile court without a full investigation by filing certain cases directly
with the District Court.22 Shortly thereafter, in Bland v. United States, the Supreme
Court was asked to decide whether the due process protections announced in
Kent were based on the statutory language of the Juvenile Court Act at the time,
or whether juveniles have a basic liberty interest in those protections.23 The Court,
however, left these questions unanswered.24
On February 8, 1971, a mere week after the amended version of the Juvenile
Court Act took effect, sixteen-year-old Jerome T. Bland was arrested for armed
robbery.25 Due to his age and the nature of the alleged offense, Bland was excluded
from juvenile court jurisdiction under the automatic exemption provisions of the
newly amended Juvenile Court Act.26 As The Honorable Aubrey E. Robinson of
the District of Columbia pointed out,
20

Id. at 554. The Court elaborated that:
Meaningful review requires that the reviewing court should review. It should not be
remitted to assumptions. It must have before it a statement of the reasons motivating
the waiver including, of course, a statement of the relevant facts. It may not ‘assume’
that there are adequate reasons, nor may it merely assume that ‘full investigation’ has
been made. Accordingly, we hold that it is incumbent upon the Juvenile Court to
accompany its waiver order with a statement of the reasons or considerations therefor.
We do not read the statute as requiring that this statement must be formal or that it
should necessarily include conventional findings of fact. But the statement should
be sufficient to demonstrate that the statutory requirement of ‘full investigation’ has
been met; and that the question has received the careful consideration of the Juvenile
Court; and it must set forth the basis for the order with sufficient specificity to permit
meaningful review.

Id. at 561.
21

Id. at 554.

22

The Juvenile Court Act of the District of Columbia, as amended in 1970, read:
(3) The term “child” means an individual who is under 18 years of age, except that
the term “child” does not include an individual who is sixteen years of age or older
and-(A) charged by the United States attorney with (i) murder, forcible rape, burglary
in the first degree, robbery while armed, or assault with intent to commit any such
offense, or (ii) an offense listed in clause (i) and any other offense properly joinable
with such an offense.

D.C. Code § 16-2301(3) (1970).
23

Bland v. United States, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973).

24

See id.

25

United States v. Bland, 330 F. Supp. 34, 34 (1971).

26

See D.C. Code § 16-2301(3)(A) (1970).
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[h]ad this sixteen-year-old been arrested for this offense prior to
February 1, 1971, he would have received the full panoply of
protections of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court system,
and that system could have waived jurisdiction resulting in his
trial as an adult only after a hearing with effective assistance of
counsel and a statement of reasons specific enough to permit this
Court to review the decision to waive jurisdiction.27
Judge Robinson struck down the amended portion of the Act, emphatically
declaring it a violation of Bland’s due process rights. Robinson stated that the
“adult-or-child decision” is “‘critically important[,]’ whether the decision is made
by the Family Division or by the United States Attorney . . . . The determination
that a child should be tried as an adult cannot be made without the safeguard
of basic due process.”28
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia overturned
Judge Robinson’s decision by a two-to-one vote.29 Justice Wilkey’s majority
opinion emphasized deference to the legislative process and the importance
of prosecutorial discretion.30 Justice Skelly Wright authored a scathing dissent
harshly criticizing the manner in which Congress deprived juveniles of their
liberty interest in juvenile court adjudication.31 Justice Wright argued that the
Supreme Court in Kent had in fact established that children under eighteen have
a constitutional right to basic due process requirements before being tried in
adult court, and Congress was “running roughshod over those rights in a manner
which is unlikely to encourage those of us still committed to constitutionalism
and the rule of law.”32
Bland filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme
Court, but the Court denied the petition by a narrow margin.33 Joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, Justice Douglas wrote an opinion dissenting to denial

27

See Bland, 330 F. Supp. at 34–35 (citing Kent v. United States 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966)).

28

Id. at 38.

29

See United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

30

Id.

31

Id. (Wright, J., dissenting).

32

Justice Wright continued:
As one who has long believed that our Constitution prohibits abrogations of due process
‘whether accomplished ingeniously or ingenuously,’ I react with a good deal of skepticism
to an argument which supposes that ‘the essence of justice’ can be defeated by a juggling
of the definition of juvenile or a minor modification of Family Court jurisdiction.

Id. at 1342 (internal citation omitted).
33

See Bland v. United States, 412 U.S. 909, 909 (1973).
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of certiorari.34 Douglas stated that the situation presented a rather large and
“substantial constitutional” question: when Congress places juveniles in a more
protected position than an adult through creation of the Juvenile Court system,
can they then make it so that, “on the whim or caprice of a prosecutor,” a juvenile
can “be put in the class of the run-of-the-mill criminal defendants;” a placement
made “without any hearing, without any chance to be heard, without any
opportunity to rebut the evidence against him, without a chance of showing that
he is being given an invidiously different treatment than others in his group?”35
The question remained unanswered. For the next thirty years violent crime
escalated across the United States and concern for protecting the constitutional
rights of juvenile offenders faded into the background. State policy makers followed
Congress’ lead as fear grew amongst the public that violent juveniles were no
different than violent adults.36 States removed more and more juvenile offenders
from the jurisdiction and rehabilitative programs of the juvenile courts, placing
them in the adult criminal justice system without any hearing or investigation.37
At the beginning of the 21st century, the Supreme Court once again took
a strong stance on the issue. The Court acknowledged an ever-growing body of
scientific research showing distinct differences between the culpability of juvenile
and adult offenders, laying down a series of rulings further legitimizing these
studies.38 In doing so, the Court recognized that due to the distinction between
juvenile and adult offenders, juveniles deserve increased constitutional protections
within the United States criminal justice system.39

I. From Rehabilitation to Punishment:
How We Came to Fear Our Youth
Before engaging in a detailed discussion of how recent Supreme Court
decisions validate a juvenile’s liberty interest in juvenile court adjudication, one
must first understand the history of the juvenile court system and its status in
today’s legal landscape. This section starts by providing a brief overview of the
beginnings of the United States juvenile court system, including the rationale
behind its creation.40 It then introduces the judicial waiver scheme,41 before

34

Id.

35

Id. at 911.

For a brief history of the juvenile court system and the “get tough” era’s impact on it, see
infra Part I.
36

37

For a discussion of the current adult court transfer procedures, see infra Part I.C.

38

For an analysis of these studies and rulings, see infra Part II.

39

See infra Part II.

40

See infra Part I.A.

41

See infra Part I.B.
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discussing several new transfer mechanisms used to send juveniles to the adult
criminal system.42

A. The Juvenile Court
The juvenile court system first appeared in the United States in Illinois
at the end of the nineteenth century.43 It was the creation of progressive
reformers who believed children were passive and innocent, and thus
incapable of possessing criminal intent.44 These progressive reformers were
“appalled by adult procedures and penalties” as applied to juveniles, including
juveniles serving long prison sentences alongside hardened criminals.45 In
response, reformers developed a juvenile court providing a specialized system for
adjudicating juveniles; a system focused on the offender’s individualized needs
regardless of the severity of the alleged offense,46 operating under the penological
goal of rehabilitation instead of punishment.47 By 1945, all states and federal
jurisdictions enacted legislation establishing separate juvenile court systems for
juvenile offenders.48
At the heart of the United States juvenile court system is the concept of
parens patriae; when parents are unable to properly care for and discipline their
child, the burden falls on the state to protect the child and the general public.49
In line with this concept, legislatures empowered states to intervene and take
over care of juveniles, based on the premise that juveniles are “dependent upon
adults; are developing emotionally, morally, and cognitively and, therefore,
are psychologically impressionable and behaviorally malleable; and have different, less competent, levels of understanding and collateral mental functioning
than adults.”50

42

See infra Part I.C.

The court was created under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899. See Ira M. Schwartz et
al., Nine Lives and Then Some: Why the Juvenile Court Does not Roll Over and Die, 33 Wake Forest
L. Rev. 533, 533 (1998).
43

Joseph F. Yeckel, Note, Violent Juvenile Offenders: Rethinking Federal Intervention in
Juvenile Justice, 51 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 331, 334 (1997).
44

Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer
to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 371, 376 (1998).
45

46
Prior to the creation of the juvenile court, juveniles were subject to the same criminal
proceedings and penalties as adults; such proceedings were concerned more with the offense than
the offender. See Yeckel, supra note 44, at 334–35.
47

Id. at 335.

48

Id.

49

See Schwartz, supra note 43, at 535.

50

Id.
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In accordance with the penological underpinnings of rehabilitation and
individualized treatment, juvenile court hearings are viewed as civil rather than
criminal proceedings.51 This distinction is apparent from several procedural
aspects of traditional juvenile court adjudications. First, children are commonly
not found “guilty” of committing a crime by a jury, but are instead deemed a “ward
of the court,” in need of help by a juvenile court judge who finds the juvenile
culpable following a showing of evidence.52 Second, the juvenile is “delinquent,”
as opposed to “criminal.”53 Third, to prevent juveniles from carrying the stigma
associated with criminal proceedings, juvenile proceedings are commonly closed
to the general public,54 and upon reaching a delineated age, a juvenile’s delinquent
record is easily sealed and expunged.55 Finally, juvenile court proceedings lack the
adversarial nature of their adult counterpart; all parties appear to determine “the
best interest of the child,” not to place the juvenile’s life or liberty in jeopardy.56
The United States Supreme Court greatly altered the initial makeup of
juvenile court proceedings with several decisions in the 1960s and 1970s by
bringing due process protections into the juvenile courtroom. In In re Gault, the
Court held that juveniles in juvenile court proceedings have the right to notice
of the charges against them, to counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses,
and to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination.57 In In re Winship, the
Court held that for a juvenile court to find a juvenile “delinquent,” it must do so
“beyond a reasonable doubt.”58
While the holdings of In re Gault and In re Winship increased the adversarial
nature of juvenile court proceedings, juvenile courts are still distinct from their
adult counterparts due to their primary focus on rehabilitation and treatment
over retribution and incapacitation.59 Moreover, while the interest of public
safety plays a bigger role in today’s juvenile courts than at their inception, the
foundation of most juvenile adjudications is still to reach an outcome that is in

Lisa A. Cintron, Comment, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juvenile
Transfers to Adult Criminal Court, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1254, 1259 (1996).
51

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

See Yeckel, supra note 44, at 335.

56

Cintron, supra note 51, at 1259.

57

See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31–42.

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). While the standard of proof for a juvenile court
hearing is now the same as adult proceedings, the finding is still made by a judge as opposed to a
jury. The Court refused to extend the right to a jury trial to juveniles in juvenile court proceedings
just a year after In re Winship. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
58

59

See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 202(b) (West 2013).
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the best interest of the child. With that said, on occasion it will be both in the
best interest of the child and the best interest of public safety to transfer a juvenile
into the adult criminal system.

B. Realizing Some Juveniles are Unfit
While many juveniles are amenable to the juvenile court’s rehabilitative
programs and services, there is always the chance some will be unfit for such
programs, thus necessitating and requiring adjudication in adult courts.
Therefore some fitness determination must be made before transfer. This fitness
determination is a crucial point in the juvenile offender’s criminal process as it
carries the grievous consequence of ultimate adjudication and disposition in the
adult criminal system. The importance of this fitness finding process cannot be
over-emphasized. Because the juvenile court system operates with the express
understanding that the adult criminal system is inadequate for juvenile offenders,
a juvenile should be denied access to the juvenile courts only when he or she is
clearly beyond rehabilitation.
Originally, transferring a juvenile to the adult criminal system occurred
only in “exceptional cases.”60 Such rarity in transfers was based on the theory
that whenever possible, children “should be protected and rehabilitated rather
than subjected to the harshness of the criminal system,” and that “children, all
children, are worth redeeming.”61 To effectuate transfer of juveniles into the adult
criminal system, legislatures developed the judicial waiver scheme.62
Judicial waiver of a juvenile to the adult court system is most often initiated
by a prosecutor filing a motion with the juvenile court.63 The juvenile court then
holds a fitness hearing to determine whether the juvenile is amenable to the
juvenile court’s treatment and services.64 Prior to the hearing, a probation officer
typically prepares an investigatory report on the juvenile’s behavioral issues and
background, presenting the findings to the presiding judge.65 At the hearing, the
party bearing the burden of proof, usually the state, presents evidence on the

60

See Cintron, supra note 51, at 1261.

61

Id.

See Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy and Practice:
Persistence, Seriousness and Race, 14 Law & Ineq. 73, 82–83 (1995).
62

See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707(a)(1) (West 2013). Again, based upon my
ultimate argument in this article, judicial waiver is currently the only adult court transfer scheme
providing juveniles proper due process protections.
63

64

See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707(a)(1) (West 2013).

65

See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707(a)(1) (West 2013).
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issue of fitness, followed by a presentation of evidence from the opposing party.66
In a majority of states, the state bears the initial burden to prove the juvenile
is not amenable to the juvenile court’s services.67 In fifteen states however, if
certain criteria are satisfied,68 the presumption shifts in favor of transfer, then
requires the juvenile to prove he is amenable to the juvenile court’s services in
order to avoid transfer.69
Following the hearing, the presiding judge makes a finding of fitness and
issues a written order including a statement of reasons for his decision.70 In Kent,
the Court delineated a list of factors a judge should consider when reaching a
finding of fitness.71 The list included: (1) the seriousness of the alleged offense
and “whether the protection of the community requires waiver”; (2) whether the
alleged offense was “aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful”; (3) “whether
the alleged offense was against persons or against property”; (4) the strength
of prosecution’s case against the juvenile; (5) whether the juvenile has adult
co-defendants; (6) “the sophistication and maturity of the juvenile,” considering
his “home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living”;
(7) the juvenile’s previous contacts with the juvenile and adult criminal justice
systems; and (8) “the prospects for adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile” by use of juvenile court
“procedures, services, and facilities.”72
If the judge finds the juvenile unfit, the judge orders the case transferred
to the adult criminal system.73 As of 2009, forty-four states and the District of
Columbia allow for transfer of juvenile cases to the adult criminal system through
judicial waiver.74 Most of these states provide their juvenile court judges with a

66
See Socrates Peter Manoukian, Distinguishing Starfish from Cobras: The Importance of
Discretion for the Juvenile Judge in Fitness Hearings, 23 Pepp. L. Rev. 805, 812 (1996).
67

See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707(a)(1) (West 2013).

This burden shift is most always based on the age of the juvenile offender at the time
of the offense, and the offenses he is alleged to have committed. See Patrick Griffin et al., Trying
Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer Laws and Reporting, Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention 3 –5 (2011), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/
232434.pdf.
68

69

See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707(a)(2)(B) (West 2013).

70

See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707(a)(1) (West 2013).

71

See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566–67 (1966).

72

Id.

73

See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707 (2014).

See Griffin et al., supra note 68, at 3. The six states that do not provide for traditional
judicial waiver are Connecticut, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, and New York.
74
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set of criteria to consider in reaching their conclusion.75 Very few states, however,
include all of the criteria laid out in Kent.76
Providing established procedures to guide judicial officers in the transfer
process, including enumerated criteria to consider when establishing fitness for
the juvenile court’s programs and services, is critical. This is because the role of
adult transfer fitness hearings in criminal procedure is not to determine whether
the juvenile committed the alleged offense. Instead, their sole purpose, in theory,
is determining whether the juvenile is amenable to the rehabilitative services
of the juvenile court system, or whether he is incapable of rehabilitation in the
juvenile courts and should be adjudicated in the adult courts.77 This finding
should be based on the juvenile’s individual degree of culpability, his background,
and his potential for reform. However, during the “get tough” era, juveniles found
themselves appearing in the adult criminal system not based on individualized
consideration of their capability to reform, but because of their age and the
severity of their alleged offense.78

C. The “Get Tough” Era
Serious and violent crime began escalating across the United States in the late
1970s, trailing into the 1990s.79 The public responded by exerting strong pressure
on politicians to “get tough on crime” and enact legislation exacting harsher
punishments on offenders.80 During that time, the public perceived juveniles as
increasingly violent, and no less dangerous or culpable than adult offenders.81

75

The State of California, for example, provides that:
the juvenile court may find that the minor is not a fit and proper subject to be
dealt with under the juvenile court law if it concludes that the minor would not
be amenable to the care, treatment, and training program available through
the facilities of the juvenile court, based upon an evaluation of the following
criteria: (A) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor.
(B) Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction. (C) The minor’s previous delinquent history. (D) Success of
previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor. (E) The circumstances
and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707(a)(1) (West 2013).
76
See Royce Scott Buckingham, The Erosion of Juvenile Court Judge Discretion in the Transfer
Decision Nationwide and in Oregon, 29 Willamette L. Rev. 689, 694 (1993). Most states amended
their transfer statutes to include more objective requirements. Id.
77

See Manoukian, supra note 66, at 813.

78

See infra Part I.C.

See U.S. Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reporting
Statistics, (Mar. 29, 2010), available at http://www.ucrdatatool.gov.
79

80
See Malika T. Djafar, Dehumanizing Youth: when California gave up on its Children, 3
Whittier J. Child & Fam. Advoc. 151, 159–60 (2003).
81

See Yeckel, supra note 44, at 345–46; see also Schwartz et al., supra note 43, at 544.
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The “get tough” mentality of the era spilled over into the juvenile court system,
shifting the focus away from rehabilitation and towards punishment, and leading
to the development of laws allowing transfer of juveniles into the adult criminal
system at an increased rate and with less difficulty.82 States rewrote their legislation
to create legislative waivers excluding juveniles from the juvenile courts through
statutory definition, mandatory judicial waivers requiring judges to transfer
juveniles based on statutorily enumerated criteria, and prosecutorial waivers
placing the decision to transfer solely in the hands of the prosecutor.83

1. Legislative Waiver
A legislative waiver operates to statutorily exclude a category of juveniles
from juvenile court jurisdiction, thereby requiring direct filing of their case in
adult court.84 This is commonly accomplished in the same manner as the District
of Columbia’s Juvenile Court Act in Bland, where the statutory code section
defining juvenile court jurisdiction states only “children” or “juveniles” are subject
to its jurisdiction.85 The legislature then defines “child” or “juvenile” to exclude
persons of a certain age alleged to have committed certain offenses, and/or persons
previously found delinquent by the juvenile court.86
82
In his dissent, Justice Wright examined the legislative process of the recent Juvenile Court
Act amendment:

The Committee Report explains 16 D.C. Code § 2301(3)(A) as follows:
Because of the great increase in the number of serious felonies committed
by juveniles and because of the substantial difficulties in transferring juvenile
offenders charged with serious felonies to the jurisdiction of the adult court
under present law, provisions are made in this subchapter for a better
mechanism for separation of the violent youthful offender and recidivist
from the rest of the juvenile community.
H.R. Rep. No. 91-907, at 50 (1970). (Emphasis added.) While the surface veneer of
legalese which encrusts this explanation need fool no one, a simultaneous translation
into ordinary English might, perhaps, prove helpful. The ‘substantial difficulties
under present law’ to which the Committee coyly refers are, of course, none other
than the constitutional rights explicated in the Kent decision.
See United States v. Bland 472 F.2d 1329, 1341 (1972) (Wright, J., dissenting).
Before 1970, only eight states had automatic transfer laws; that number jumped to 38 by
the year 2000. Similarly, only one state had a prosecutorial waiver scheme in its legislation before
1970, that number was fifteen by the year 2000. See Griffin et al., supra note 68, at 8–9.
83

84

The Washington State legislature adopted the following definition:
‘Juvenile,’ ‘youth,’ and ‘child’ mean any individual who is under the chronological
age of eighteen years and who has not been previously transferred to adult court
pursuant to RCW 13.40.110, unless the individual was convicted of a lesser charge
or acquitted of the charge for which he or she was previously transferred pursuant to
RCW 13.40.110 or who is not otherwise under adult court jurisdiction . . . .

See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.020 (2013).
85

See Bland v. United States, 412 U.S. 909, 910 (1973).

86

See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.020 (2013).
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As of 2009, twenty-nine states enacted legislative waiver statutes.87 In these
states, a juvenile is almost always deemed unfit for the juvenile courts based purely
on his age and the allegedly committed crime.88 Because the case against the
juvenile is filed directly in adult court by operation of law, he is subjected to the
adult criminal justice system without a single opportunity to be heard by anyone
as to his individual circumstances. He is denied the opportunity to state why he
should be considered fit for the juvenile court’s rehabilitative services.

2. Mandatory Judicial Waiver
On its face, mandatory judicial waiver appears similar to legislative waiver,
in that if certain elements are met—charged offense, age, delinquency history,
etc.—then the juvenile court judge is required by law to transfer the case to the
adult criminal justice system.89 Mandatory judicial waiver is unique, however, in
that the case is first filed in juvenile court for the sole purpose of having a juvenile
court judge determine the statutory elements are met, and that probable cause
on the allegations exists before transferring the juvenile to adult court.90 This
mandatory transfer is also triggered by motion of the state prosecutor once the
case is originally filed in juvenile court, with similar judicial fact-finding procedures
on the merits of the charge and the transfer statute following such motion.91
As of 2009, fifteen states enacted mandatory judicial waiver schemes.92
Juveniles have a slight benefit under mandatory judicial waiver over legislative
87
The following states have enacted legislative waiver statues: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
See Griffin et al., supra note 68, at 3.

See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 602(b) (2013) (“Any person who is alleged, when
he or she was 14 years of age or older, to have committed one of the following offenses shall be
prosecuted under the general law in a court of criminal jurisdiction . . . .”).
88

89
See, e.g., 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 405/5-805(1)(c) (West 2013) (“If a petition alleges
commission by a minor 15 years of age or older of: (i) an act that constitutes an offense enumerated
in the presumptive transfer provisions of subsection (2); and (ii) the minor has previously been
adjudicated delinquent or found guilty of a forcible felony, the Juvenile Judge designated to hear and
determine those motions shall, upon determining that there is probable cause that both allegations
are true, enter an order permitting prosecution under the criminal laws of Illinois.”).
90

Id.

See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 31-30-3-6 (West 2013) (“Upon motion by the prosecuting
attorney, the juvenile court shall waive jurisdiction if it finds that: (1) the child is charged with an act
which would be a felony if committed by an adult; and (2) the child has previously been convicted
of a felony or a nontraffic misdemeanor.”). Compare to legislative waiver schemes which require
prosecutors to file case directly into the adult court system.
91

92
The states that have enacted mandatory judicial waiver schemes include: Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. See Griffin et al., supra
note 68, at 3.
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waiver schemes. Under mandatory judicial waiver, the juvenile court judge
may—before he is required to transfer the juvenile to adult court jurisdiction—at
a minimum handle preliminary matters such as appointment of counsel and
pre-trial detention decisions.93 This allows the juvenile some interaction with
attorneys and court personnel more accustomed to dealing with juveniles and
understanding of their unique needs. Nevertheless, as with legislative waivers,
even if all parties involved feel the juvenile would be better served in juvenile
court, transfer is eventually made by operation of law.

3. Prosecutorial Waiver
Some states place a category of juveniles under concurrent jurisdiction. Based
on the age of the juvenile, charges against him, and/or his prior delinquent history,
a juvenile is subject to the jurisdiction of both the juvenile and adult court systems
simultaneously.94 In these instances, a prosecutor may file the case either initially
in juvenile court or directly in the adult criminal system.95 Prosecutorial waiver
schemes rarely require the prosecutor to use any criteria in his decision-making,
leaving the decision instead to his sole discretion.96 As of 2009, fourteen states
and the District of Columbia enacted statutes allowing prosecutorial waiver of
juveniles into the adult criminal system.97
***
In taking the focus away from the individualized needs and circumstances of
the juvenile, legislative, mandatory judicial, and prosecutorial waivers not only
93

Id. at 4.

See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-203(f ) (West 2013) (“The district attorney shall serve as
the single point of entry for all minors alleged to have committed a crime. . . . The following cases,
excluding status offenses, may be originally commenced either in the juvenile court or in the district
court or inferior court having jurisdiction . . . .”).
94

95

Id.

In fact, “[n]o situation exists in the criminal system analogous to the unfettered discretion many prosecutors enjoy in choosing the forum in which to try a juvenile.” Stacey Sabo, Note,
Rights of Passage: An Analysis of Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2425,
2447 (1996).
96

The states that have enacted statutes allowing for prosecutorial waivers of juveniles into the
adult criminal system include: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. See Griffin et al.,
supra note 68, at 3.
97

It should be noted that the prosecutor’s unfettered charging discretion is almost always the
initial discretionary decision for a juvenile’s case being transferred into the adult criminal system,
even under legislature and mandatory judicial waiver schemes. This is because waiver under those
schemes is usually triggered by the specific charges against the juvenile. Furthermore, even if a
prosecutor files a case initially in juvenile court, he can still file a motion to move the case to the
adult criminal system, triggering the traditional judicial waiver scheme. The initial filing in juvenile
court never removes from the prosecutor his discretion to file a case in adult court upon further
investigation into the culpability of the juvenile at issue.
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go against the foundational purposes of the juvenile court system, but also the
Court’s recent holdings regarding juveniles in the criminal justice system. These
holdings elaborate on the unique characteristics and traits of juvenile offenders
and the unique constitutional protections they demand.98 Because these waiver
schemes trigger transfer based on the charged offense and the juvenile’s age, they
fail to focus on the individualized needs of the juvenile over the offense allegedly
committed, thus failing to value rehabilitation over punishment.
The policies at the heart of the juvenile court system—rehabilitation over
punishment, and recognition of the developmental and cognitive deficiencies
of juveniles—are present in the original adult court transfer mechanism, the
judicial waiver scheme. Under this scheme, a fitness hearing is held, taking the
focus away from the charged crime and placing it back on the juvenile himself
and his ability to reform.99 In providing such a hearing before the juvenile is
potentially cast off into the adult criminal system, judicial waiver schemes comply
with Constitutional due process protections by giving the juvenile a meaningful
opportunity to be heard before potentially suffering a grievous loss.

II. Juveniles are Different
When Kent and Bland were decided, studies on the cognitive differences
between juvenile and adult offenders were still in their infancy. But over the last
several decades, an increasing number of studies analyzed these differences.100 The
United States Supreme Court noticed and used this vast new well of information in
crafting its recent decisions concerning juveniles in the criminal justice system.101
The Court in Roper v. Simmons delineated three major cognitive and
developmental characteristics unique to juveniles that make them generally less
culpable than their adult counterparts.102 The Court built upon these unique,
juvenile characteristics in Graham v. Florida, stating that the main penological
theories of punishment are not as applicable to juveniles.103 Following Roper and
98

See infra Part II.

99

See supra Part I.B.

100

See infra Parts II.A.1–3.

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010);
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
101

The Court emphasized that allowing juries and judges to even consider the death penalty
for juveniles creates an “unacceptable likelihood . . . that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any
particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even
where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should
require a sentence less severe than death.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 572–73.
102

103
Graham, 560 U.S. at 74. (“[P]enological theory,” the Court stated, “is not adequate to
justify life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. This determination; the limited
culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders; and the severity of life without parole sentences all
lead to the conclusion that the sentencing practice under consideration is cruel and unusual.”).
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Graham, the Court decided J.D.B. v. North Carolina.104 In J.D.B., the Court
held that the unique cognitive and developmental characteristics of juveniles
not only demonstrate decreased culpability, but also signal a need to provide
increased constitutional protections for juveniles in a highly confusing, complex,
and pressure-filled criminal justice system.105 Finally in 2012, the Court decided
Miller v. Alabama.106 The Court in Miller initiated a seismic shift in juvenile
adjudication by holding that judges must take the unique developmental and
cognitive characteristics of juveniles into account when imposing certain
sentences, instead of focusing solely on the statutory violation at the heart of
the conviction.107

A. What Makes a Juvenile Different: Roper v. Simmons
Christopher Simmons was seventeen years old when, together with some
friends, he broke into the home of a woman, then kidnapped and murdered her.108
Simmons convinced his friends to aid him in this atrocious crime by assuring
them that “they could ‘get away with it’ because they were minors.”109 Simmons
was subsequently charged with, among other things, first-degree murder.110 Due
to his age and the charges against him, Simmons was automatically excluded
from Missouri’s juvenile court jurisdiction.111 Following a jury trial, Simmons was
found guilty of murder and ultimately sentenced to death.112
104

J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).

105

The Court stressed that:
in many cases involving juvenile suspects, the custody analysis would be nonsensical absent some consideration of the suspect’s age. . . . Neither officers nor
courts can reasonably evaluate the effect of objective circumstances that, by their
nature, are specific to children without accounting for the age of the child subjected
to those circumstances.

J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2405.
106

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).

The Court stated that a mandatory sentencing scheme “requiring that all children convicted
of homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and
age-related characteristics and the nature of their crimes,” violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on
cruel and unusual punishment. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475.
107

108

The Court stated that:
[u]sing duct tape to cover her eyes and mouth and bind her hands, the two perpetrators
put Mrs. Crook in her minivan and drove to a state park. They reinforced the
bindings, covered her head with a towel, and walked her to a railroad trestle spanning
the Meramec River. There they tied her hands and feet together with electrical wire,
wrapped her whole face in duct tape and threw her from the bridge, drowning her in
the waters below.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556–57 (2005).
109

Id. at 556.

110

Id. at 557.

111

Id.

112

Id. at 558.
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After Simmons exhausted his direct appeals of the conviction, the United
States Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia.113 In Atkins, the Court held
that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited execution of mentally
retarded persons due to their reduced culpability.114 Simmons filed a petition
with the Missouri Supreme Court seeking post-conviction relief on the grounds
that, just as the Constitution prohibits execution of mentally retarded persons,
it likewise prohibits execution of a juvenile who was under the age of eighteen
when the crime occurred.115 Both the Missouri Supreme Court and United States
Supreme Court agreed with Simmons.116
The United States Supreme Court found that society draws the line
between childhood and adulthood at age eighteen, and this is likewise where the
Constitution draws the line between allowing and disallowing a death sentence.117
The Court stressed that “[t]he differences between juvenile and adult offenders
are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive
the death penalty despite insufficient culpability.”118 The Court relied heavily
on a series of scientific studies regarding the physiological and psychological
developmental differences between juveniles and adults.119 The Court used these
studies to delineate three distinct traits that demonstrate decreased culpability in
juvenile offenders compared to their adult counterparts: (1) the immaturity of
the juvenile, (2) the juvenile’s increased susceptibility to outside influences, and
(3) the transitory and unformed character of juveniles.

1. The Immaturity of Juveniles
The Court first emphasized a juvenile’s immaturity and “underdeveloped
sense of responsibility,” which often results in “impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions.”120 This immaturity is demonstrated in one study finding
statistical overrepresentation of juveniles “in virtually every category of reckless
behavior.”121 The Court further found that almost every state recognizes the
immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles—demonstrated by prohibiting
juveniles under eighteen from “voting, serving on juries, or marrying without
parental consent.”122
113

See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

114

Id.

115

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 559.

116

See State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (2003) (en banc).

117

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.

118

Id. at 572–73.

119

Id. at 569–70.

120

Id. at 569 (citing Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).

121

Id. (citing Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 Devel
Rev. 339 (1992)).

opmental
122

Id.
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The Court’s emphasis on juvenile immaturity is further supported by both
the scientific community and the general public, where it is well understood that
reasoning capabilities improve throughout adolescence.123 These improvements
result from a juvenile’s increase in specific and general knowledge as he gains
an education and experiences life first-hand.124 A juvenile’s improved reasoning
capabilities also develop through increases in “information-processing skills,
including attention, short- and long-term memory, and organization.”125
A series of studies conducted between 1995 and 2003 demonstrate the
extent of a juvenile’s immaturity.126 In these studies, juveniles were presented with
hypothetical dilemmas and then asked to make and explain their decisions.127
Juveniles tended to discount future effects of their actions much more than
adults.128 The studies also found juveniles far more likely to place greater weight
on rewards than risks in a risk-reward analysis.129 Finally, the studies demonstrated
that juveniles are much more likely than adults to engage in impulsive behavior
without even going through a risk-reward analysis.130 These studies show just how
greatly juveniles disregard the potential risks and consequences of their actions,
and just how immature the average juvenile offender really is.

2. Susceptibility to Outside Influences
The Court next found that increased susceptibility of juveniles to outside
negative influences, including peer pressure, makes them less culpable overall
Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009,
1011 (2003).
123

124

Id.

125

Id.

See, e.g., Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adoles
cence: why Adolescents may be Less Culpable than Adults, 18 Behav. Sci. & L. 741 (2000); Elizabeth
Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 Law & Hum. Behav. 221
(1995); Laurence Steinberg, Is Decision-Making the Right Framework for the Study of Adolescent
Risk-Taking?, Reducing Adolescent Risk: Toward an Integrate Approach 18–24 (Daniel Romer
ed., 2003); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision-Making, 20 Law & Hum. Behav. 249 (1996).
126

See supra note 126 and accompanying text. Steinberg and Scott emphasize that “[i]n
the real world, and especially in situations in which crimes are committed, however, adolescents’
decisions are not hypothetical, they are generally made under conditions of emotional arousal . . .
and they usually are made in groups.” See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 123, at 1012.
127

128
This is most likely due to the cognitive limitations of juveniles; a result of their inability to
fully comprehend events that have not yet occurred and their lack of life experiences. See Steinberg
& Scott, supra note 123, at 1012.
129
For example, when posed with a hypothetical about whether or not to engage in the use of
experimental drugs; adults tended to consider the risky consequences more than juveniles. Steinberg
& Scott, supra note 123, at 1012.
130

Id.
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than adult offenders.131 As the Court stressed, juveniles have comparatively less
control over their environment than adults.132 Combined with their psychological
vulnerability, juveniles have “a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing
to escape negative influences.”133
Scientific studies confirm the Court’s observations, showing that due to the
developmental immaturity of the average juvenile, he is more likely to respond
adversely to external pressures than an adult in the same circumstance.134
Considering juveniles are generally more impulsive than adults, a lesser perceived
threat would more readily invoke a violent response from a juvenile than from
an adult.135 Moreover, due to a juvenile’s inability to properly consider future
consequences of his actions, “the same level of duress may have a more disruptive
impact on [his] decision making” than on adults.136

3. The Transitory and Unformed Character of Juveniles
Finally, the Court recognized that the character of a juvenile is not fully
formed, and is much more transitory than that of an adult.137 Because juveniles
“still struggle to define their identity,” it would be “misguided to equate the
failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a
minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.”138
Juvenile character deficiencies can be reformed because the juvenile slowly
pieces together his identity throughout adolescence while engaging in wide
ranging exploration and experimentation.139 Unfortunately for the juvenile and
society, “this experimentation [often] involves risky, illegal, or dangerous activities
like alcohol use, drug use, unsafe sex, and antisocial behavior.”140 Fortunately,
however, only a small percentage of adolescents engaging in risky, dangerous, and
illegal behavior develop “entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persists

131
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 115 (1982)) (“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when
a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.”).
132

Id. at 570.

133

Id.

See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 123, at 1014. (“If adolescents are more susceptible to
hypothetical peer pressure than are adults . . . it stands to reason that age differences in susceptibility to real peer pressure will be even more considerable.”).
134

135

Id.

136

Id.

137

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (citing E. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968)).

138

Id.

139

See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 123, at 1014.

140

Id.
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into adulthood.”141 Thus, juvenile offender’s decisions to engage in criminal
activity result from developmental forces inherent in adolescence, and do not
necessarily express a manifestation of bad moral character.142 In contrast, many
adult offenders engage in criminal activity due to choices based on entrenched
preferences and values,143 and are therefore justifiably charged for deficient moral
character by the state.144
The Court in Roper recognized this distinction, and held that a juvenile
offender’s bad character is most often transitory and shaped by external influences
outside his control.145 In line with this recognition, the Court pointed out
fundamental flaws within our criminal justice system when we treat juveniles
the same as adults, and that these flawed procedures have constitutional
ramifications.146

B. Juveniles and the Penological Theories of Sentencing: Graham v. Florida
In Graham, the Court continued analyzing the differences between juveniles
and adults under the Eighth Amendment, focusing more heavily on the theories
behind sentencing in general.147 The Court used the three main developmental
characteristics of juvenile offenders outlined in Roper to prevent certain juvenile
offenders from receiving the second most severe penalty our criminal justice
system offers: life without the possibility of parole (LWOPP).148 In doing so, the
Id. at 1014–15 (citing M. Tonry & N. Morris, Crime and Justice: An annual review
189–217 (University of Chicago Press, 1986); T. Moffit, Adolescence-limited and
life-course-persistent antisocial behavior: A developmental taxonomy, 100 Psych. Rev. 674–701
(1993)). “At least until late adolescence, individuals’ values, attitudes, beliefs, and plans are likely to
be tentative and exploratory expressions rather than enduring representations of personhood.” Id.
141

of research

142

Id.

143

Id.

144

Id.

145

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–72.

146

The Court stated that:
Because the death penalty is the most severe punishment, the Eighth Amendment
applies to it with special force. . . . Capital punishment must be limited to those
offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose
extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’ . . . Three general
differences between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders
cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.

Id. at 568–69 (internal citations omitted).
147

See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).

148

The Court held that:
The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a
juvenile offender who did not commit homicide. A State need not guarantee the
offender eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him or her
with some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.

Id. at 82.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol14/iss2/11

22

Hamack: Go Directly to Jail, Do Not Pass Juvenile Court, Do Not Collect D

2014

A Denial of Basic Due Process Rights

797

Court determined that penological theories do not apply to juvenile offenders
such as Terrance Graham—the juvenile offender who was the subject of the
case—the same as they do to adult offenders.149
Terrance Graham’s parents were addicted to crack cocaine, and he was
diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder while in elementary
school.150 At nine years old he began smoking cigarettes and drinking alcohol, and
at thirteen years old began experimenting with recreational drugs.151 At seventeen,
Graham was arrested and charged as an adult for armed burglary and armed
robbery.152 He was found guilty of both charges and sentenced to LWOPP.153
Graham appealed his sentence, claiming it violated his Eighth Amendment
rights.154 The First District Court of Appeals of Florida affirmed the sentence,
holding that it was not grossly disproportionate to his crimes.155 After the
Florida Supreme Court denied review,156 the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, ultimately holding that Graham’s sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment.157
Building on the categorical distinction between juvenile and adult offenders
it recognized in Roper, the Court held that offenders under the age of eighteen
who commit non-homicide crimes may not be sentenced to LWOPP.158 The
Court emphasized the importance of allowing juvenile offenders the possibility of
release, stating that “[m]aturity can lead to that considered reflection which is the
foundation for remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation.”159 The Court added that the

149

Id. at 71–74.

150

Id. at 53.

151

Id.

152

Id.

153

The Court stated that:
[The sentencing judge] sentenced [Graham] to the maximum sentence authorized by
law on each charge: life imprisonment for the armed burglary and 15 years for the
attempted armed robbery. Because Florida has abolished its parole system, see Fla.
Stat. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003), a life sentence gives a defendant no possibility of release
unless he is granted executive clemency.

Id. at 57. During Graham’s sentencing, the judge stated, “[g]iven your escalating pattern of criminal
conduct, it is apparent to the Court that you have decided that this is the way you are going to
live your life and that the only thing I can do now is to try and protect the community from your
actions.” Id.
154

Id. at 58.

155

See Graham v. State, 982 So.2d 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).

156

See Graham v. State, 990 So.2d 1058 (Fla. 2008).

157

See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).

158

Id. at 74–75 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005)).

159

Id. at 79.
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penological justifications for a LWOPP sentence—retribution, incapacitation,
deterrence, and rehabilitation—do not apply to juveniles charged with nonhomicide crimes.160
The Court did not, however, impede on society’s right to impose retributive
punishment on juvenile non-homicide offenders to “express its condemnation of
the crime and to seek restoration of the moral imbalance caused by the offense.”161
But the Court emphasized that this entitlement must be balanced against the
fact that the “heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must
be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.”162
Considering the reduced culpability of juveniles, retribution does not justify
imposing LWOPP on juveniles guilty of non-homicide crimes.163
The Court then recognized that while the harshness of a LWOPP sentence
may strongly deter adults, juveniles are less susceptible to such deterrence.164 Due
to the juvenile’s lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility, he
is less likely than an adult to consider potential consequences and punishment
when making decisions.165 When considering a juvenile’s “diminished moral
responsibility, any limited deterrent effect provided by [LWOPP] is not enough
to justify the sentence[’s]” imposition.166
The Court further held that the penological goal of incapacitation fails to
justify imposing LWOPP on juveniles convicted of non-homicide crimes.167 The
main incapacitation justification behind a LWOPP sentence—that the offender
will forever be a danger to society—goes against the very characteristics that make
a juvenile a juvenile: their immaturity, susceptibility to outside influences, and
transitory and unformed character.168 Simply put, “incorrigibility is inconsistent
with youth.”169 The Court concluded by pointing out the obvious: rehabilitation
is an inapplicable justification, as LWOPP “forswears altogether the rehabilitative
ideal.”170 The sentence reflects “an irrevocable judgment about [a juvenile’s] value
and place in society,” a judgment at odds with his capacity for change.171
160

Id. at 71–73.

161

Id. at 71.

162

Id. (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).

163

Id.

164

Id. at 71–72.

165

Id.

166

Id. at 72.

167

Id.

168

Id. at 72–73.

169

Id. at 73 (citing Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968)).

170

Id. at 74.

171

Id.
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In analyzing the penological interests behind imposing a LWOPP sentence
on juvenile offenders, the Graham Court built upon its delineation of a juvenile’s
decreased criminal culpability first established in Roper.172 Because of this decreased
culpability, the theories and interests behind the adult criminal justice system do
not apply equally to juveniles.173 These two holdings made the Court’s position
clear: juvenile offenders are different, both scientifically and constitutionally. With
the road paved by Roper and Graham, the Court in J.D.B. began honing in on
the constitutional differences, ultimately granting individualized constitutional
procedural protections to juvenile offenders.174

C. Extending the Juvenile Distinction Beyond the Eighth Amendment:
J.D.B. v. North Carolina
In Roper and Graham the Court applied its “juvenile offenders are different”
framework only within the confines of the Eighth Amendment.175 J.D.B. v.
North Carolina took that framework and extended its application to the Fifth
Amendment.176 In doing so, the Court held that the unique developmental
and cognitive characteristics of juveniles should be considered throughout the
entire criminal justice process, including the focus of J.D.B.—pre-adjudication
procedures such as police interrogations.177
Thirteen-year-old J.D.B. was at Smith Middle School in North Carolina
when a uniformed police officer walked into his classroom and escorted him to a
closed-door conference room.178 Waiting in the room was another police officer,
J.D.B.’s assistant principal, and an administrative intern.179 Without reading
J.D.B. his Miranda warnings, police and school officials questioned him for
thirty to forty-five minutes regarding a series of recent break-ins.180 J.D.B. was
172

See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).

173

Id. at 62–67.

174

See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).

175

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555–56 (2005); Graham, 560 U.S. at 52.

176

See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2398–99.

177

Id. at 2407–08.

178

Id. at 2399.

179

Id.

Id. at 2399; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444– 45 (1966) (“Prior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement
he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any
manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking
there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that
he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may
have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of
the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and
thereafter consents to be questioned.”).
180
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not allowed to speak with his guardian, nor was he informed that he was free to
leave the room.181 J.D.B. eventually confessed that he and another youth were
responsible for the break-ins.182
Prosecutors subsequently filed two petitions in juvenile court charging J.D.B.
with breaking and entering and larceny.183 J.D.B.’s attorney motioned the court
to suppress the statements made during the interrogation, arguing that they
were obtained without adequate Miranda warnings and in violation of J.D.B.’s
Fifth Amendment rights.184 The juvenile court denied the motion, and
subsequently adjudicated J.D.B. a delinquent youth.185 The North Carolina Court
of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s decision,186 as did the North Carolina
Supreme Court.187 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and
ultimately held that an individual’s age does play a role in determining whether
someone is “in custody” for Miranda purposes.188
In reaching its conclusion, the Court stated that the inherently compelling
pressures of custodial interrogation “can induce a frighteningly high percentage
of people to confess to crimes they never committed,”189 the risk being even more
acute and troubling when the subject is a juvenile.190 When asking whether a
“reasonable person would feel free to leave,” there will be circumstances where the
juvenile’s age affects his perception due to his increased susceptibility to external
influences, as outlined in Roper.191 Where a reasonable adult might feel free to

181

J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399.

182

Id. at 2400.

183

Id.

184

Id.

Id. Most juvenile courts across the country adjudicate juvenile offenders in order to
determine whether they are delinquent, as opposed to adjudicating them to determine whether
they are guilty of committing a crime. Once a juvenile is found to be delinquent the juvenile court
then has authority to place the juvenile on probation, in rehabilitative services and programs, or in
detention if needed. See infra Part III.B.
185

186

See In re J.D.B., 674 S.E.2d 795 (2009).

The North Carolina Supreme Court held that J.D.B. was not in custody at the time of the
interrogation—one of the requirements for Miranda protections to apply—and further refused to
extend the custody analysis to include consideration of the age of the individual being interrogated.
See In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 140 (2009).
187

188
The Court noted, “[i]t is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to
police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave.” J.D.B., 131 S.
Ct. at 2398–99.
189

Id. at 2401.

190

Id.

191

Id. at 2402–03.
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leave, a reasonable juvenile in the same situation almost certainly would not,192
which is “self-evident to anyone who was a child once himself . . . .”193
The Court concluded by pointing out that our history is “‘replete with laws
and judicial recognition that children cannot be viewed simply as miniature
adults.’”194 When reviewing the effects of an interrogation on a juvenile
interrogatee, it would be absurd to disregard the age of the interrogatee when the
objective factors making up the court’s analysis are viewed through the eyes of a
juvenile at the time of the interrogation. Due to the differing effects interrogations
have on juveniles and adults, there may be times when a juvenile is found to
be “in custody” when an adult would not be, even though the objective factors
making up the review are the same.
The Court in J.D.B. recognized that juveniles require individualized
consideration of their age to ensure adequate protection of their constitutional
rights within the criminal justice system.195 It made clear that juveniles deserve
increased procedural protections at the front end of the criminal justice process
when dealing with law enforcement officers in interrogation settings.196 In Miller
v. Alabama, the Court made clear that juveniles deserve increased procedural
protections at the back end as well.

D. Focus on the Juvenile, Not the Crime: Miller v. Alabama
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court revisited the Eighth Amendment.197 The
Miller Court announced that statutory schemes imposing mandatory LWOPP
sentences on juveniles are unconstitutional, even for commission of the most
heinous crimes; and that the sentencing judge must take into account the

192

The Court elaborated that:
Time and again, this Court has drawn these common-sense conclusions for itself. We
have observed that children “generally are less mature and responsible than adults,”
[Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 115–116 (1982)]; that they “often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them,” Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opinion);
that they “are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures” than adults,
[Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)]; and so on.

Id. at 2403.
193

Id.

194

Id. at 2404 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).

195

Id.

196

Id.

197

See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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individual characteristics of the youth before he can impose a LWOPP sentence.198
In the case of Evan Miller, instead of sentencing him to LWOPP following a
finding of guilt for murder, the sentencing judge was ordered to take into account
the disturbingly unique characteristics of Miller’s life and the crime itself before
determining whether he truly deserved such punishment.199
Miller spent most of his life in and out of foster care as his mother was an
alcoholic drug user and his stepfather abused him.200 Early in life, Miller began
using drugs and alcohol, and attempted suicide four times.201 In 2003, fourteenyear-old Miller, along with a friend, attempted to rob his mother’s neighbor
while asleep in his trailer.202 The neighbor awoke in the middle of the robbery
and began choking Miller.203 After Miller’s friend used a bat to break Miller free,
Miller grabbed the bat and used it to repeatedly beat the neighbor.204 Miller and
his friend then lit the trailer on fire to destroy the evidence.205 The neighbor died
due to smoke inhalation and the injuries inflicted by Miller.206
Prosecutors charged Miller in the adult criminal system with murder in
the course of arson—a charge carrying a mandatory minimum punishment
Id. at 2460. At this point, a discussion of the strong and well-written dissenting opinions
of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas in Miller is necessary. The dissenting opinion of Chief
Justice Roberts focuses on the Court using its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to take over the
legislative process and repeatedly draw—and subsequently erase when it feels ready—lines between
what is cruel and unusual and what is not, using the “proportionality test” as its pencil and eraser.
See id. at 2477–83 (Roberts, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas focuses on
his opinion that there is no “proportionality test” for non-capital sentences, and that the court
inappropriately applied such a proportionality test in striking down mandatory LWOPP sentences
for juveniles. See id. at 2483–87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
198

The opinions of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas are highly persuasive. But
the argument presented here—that due process demands a fitness hearing for juveniles before
being transferred to the adult criminal system—is founded not in the application of the Eighth
Amendment proportionality analysis to non-capital sentences, but more so on the underlying
reasons as to why the Court felt compelled to engage in the proportionality analysis to begin with.
It is not the fact that the Court found LWOPP to be “cruel and unusual” for juvenile offenders that
drives the argument here, it is the Court’s finding that “juveniles are different.” Even if juvenile
offenders could be subjected to LWOPP sentences under the Eighth Amendment, it would not
change the fact that their developmental and cognitive limitations make them generally less culpable
than their adult offender counterparts.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. (“Graham, Roper, and our individualized sentencing decisions
make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances
before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”).
199

200

Id. at 2462.

201

His first suicide attempt being at age six. Id.

202

Id.

203

Id.

204

Id.

205

Id.

206

Id.
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of LWOPP.207 Following a jury trial, Miller was found guilty and sentenced
to LWOPP.208 Miller appealed and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed—ruling that the sentence was not overly harsh compared to the crime
and that there was nothing impermissible about the mandatory sentencing
scheme.209 The United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the
“Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates LWOPP for
juvenile offenders.”210
The Court reemphasized the rationale behind its holdings in Roper and
Graham: “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
sentencing.”211 These differences stem from the distinctive and transitory mental
traits and environmental vulnerabilities of children.212 Moreover, these traits and
vulnerabilities are not crime-specific, but instead evidence decreased culpability
“in the same way, and to the same degree, when . . . a botched robbery turns into
a killing.”213
In criticizing mandatory LWOPP sentences for juveniles, the Court made a
significant statement:
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes
consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—
among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate
risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the
family and home environment that surrounds him—and from
which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how
brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the
homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in
the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have
affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged
and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies
associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with
police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or
his incapacity to assist his own attorneys . . . finally, this manda
tory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even
when the circumstances most suggest it.214
207

Id.

208

Id.

209

See Miller v. State, 63 So.3d 676, 690 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. Even states that upheld such sentencing schemes under their
State Constitutions were forced by the Court to reevaluate such schemes in light of Miller. See, e.g.,
Bear Cloud v. State, 294 P.3d 36, 48 (Wyo. 2013).
210

211

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.

212

See supra notes 120–44 and accompanying text.

213

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.

214

Id. at 2468.
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The Court’s holding in Miller is the culmination of a series of cases, starting
with Roper, making clear the Court’s stance: juvenile offenders are different
than their adult counterparts, and juveniles, accordingly, deserve increased
individualized protections when placed in the criminal justice system.215
These protections are founded in both public policy and the United States
Constitution.216 At the same time, however, one of the most important procedural
protections we provide juveniles in our society—a full fitness hearing prior to
an adult court transfer—is slowly eroding.217 The original adult court transfer
scheme, one requiring a full fitness hearing, is becoming less and less utilized
across the United States in favor of transfer schemes that make no attempt to
understand the individualized circumstances of juvenile offenders.218 If juvenile
offenders are truly different from their adult counterparts due to their unique
traits and vulnerabilities—a conclusion supported by the Supreme Court’s
holdings and numerous scientific studies—then it is crucial that procedures are
in place to ensure treatment of juvenile offenders according to their age and
capabilities, and not according to the crime they allegedly committed.

E. A Lingering Question: When does a Juvenile Stop Being a Juvenile
Depending on the state, the upper age of juvenile court jurisdiction varies
from fifteen to seventeen years of age.219 But for the limited purpose of this
article, the cut-off for a juvenile’s liberty interest in juvenile court adjudication
is the day he turns eighteen.220 This is based on numerous factors, including the
line drawn by the Roper Court for death penalty eligibility,221 the line drawn
by the Graham Court for LWOPP eligibility for non-homicide crimes,222 and
the Miller Court forbidding LWOPP sentences for juveniles under age eighteen
convicted of homicide offenses without proper individualized considerations by
the sentencing court.223 Furthermore, eighteen is where society draws the line for

215

See infra Parts II.A–C.

216

See supra Parts I–II.

217

See supra Part I.C.

218

See supra Part I.C.

See Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book:
Upper age of original juvenile court jurisdiction, 2011, (Dec. 17, 2012), available at http://www.
ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/qa04101.asp.
219

Almost 75% of states and the federal jurisdiction allow juveniles up until their eighteenth
birthday to be adjudicated under the jurisdiction of their juvenile courts. Id. The upper age of
juvenile court jurisdiction is seventeen in thirty-seven states and the federal jurisdiction, sixteen in
eleven states, and fifteen in two states. Id.
220

221

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

222

See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).

223

See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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many purposes related to a juvenile’s immaturity and decreased decision-making
capacity, including eligibility for voting, marrying without parental consent, and
serving on a jury.224
The upper age of juvenile court jurisdiction is important because, just as the
unique characteristics of a juvenile do not disappear when a botched robbery
turns into a homicide, they do not magically disappear the day he turns eighteen.
Such an important topic however requires far more in-depth discussion than the
scope of this paper allows. But even if it is unclear where the line lies—if one exists
at all—the Court has recognized that there is a difference between juvenile and
adult offenders, and this recognition cannot be ignored. Moreover, it is precisely
this recognition that reveals the liberty interest of juveniles that requires Due
Process Clause protection.

III. A Violation of Basic Due Process Rights
The Miller Court’s disapproval of the automatic application of LWOPP
sentences for juvenile offenders represents a seismic shift in how our judicial
system should analyze adjudication procedures for juvenile offenders. The
categorization of juveniles based solely on the crime they allegedly committed
skirts the limits of the Constitution. When the categorization carries with it
grievous consequences for the juvenile, it violates those limits. Just as the automatic
application of LWOPP sentences forbidden in Miller preclude “consideration
of [the juvenile’s] chronological age and its hallmark features—among them
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,”225—
so to do automatic transfer and prosecutorial waiver laws that deprive juveniles
of fitness hearings. These laws prevent the court from “taking into account the
family and home environment that surrounds [the juvenile]—and from which
he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional.”226
They neglect analyzing the circumstances surrounding the alleged offense,
“including the extent of [the juvenile’s] participation in the conduct and the way
familial and peer pressures may have affected him.”227 Furthermore, they ignore
the possibility that the juvenile may have been charged with a lesser offense “if
not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal
with police officers . . . .”228 Finally, and most significantly, laws transferring
juveniles to the adult court system absent fitness hearings disregard the possibility
of rehabilitation, even when a juvenile’s circumstances and background indicate
a high probability of success if he were to engage in the juvenile court’s programs
and services.
224

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.

225

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.

226

Id.

227

Id.

228

Id.
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The United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Kent, In re Gault, and In
re Winship provided juveniles with increased due process protections in juvenile
court proceedings.229 This trend came to a halt with the “get tough” era.230 Thirty
years later, with its holdings in Roper, Graham, J.D.B., and Miller, the Court
once again recognized juveniles deserved increased constitutional protections
within the criminal justice system.231 Now is the time for the Court to make the
statement it should have made forty years ago in Bland : hold that juveniles suffer
such a grievous loss when transferred to the adult criminal system, that doing so
without proper protection violates due process.
This position is mandated by the Court’s recent holdings, the scientific
research they rest upon, and the foundational purposes of juvenile courts. This
section first provides a foundation for this position by giving an overview of the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.232 It then argues that under
the Due Process Clause juveniles have a liberty interest in adjudication within
the juvenile court system.233 Finally, it concludes by arguing that to adequately
protect this liberty interest, the Due Process Clause demands a full fitness hearing
before a juvenile is transferred to the adult criminal system—a hearing similar to
those utilized in traditional judicial waiver schemes.234

A. When Due Process Protections Apply
Procedural due process protections are found in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution.235 They provide that no person shall be
deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”236 In Mathews v.
Eldridge, the United States Supreme Court developed a balancing test to
determine when procedural due process protections are implicated, and if so,
how much procedural due process a person is entitled.237 The Court explained
that procedural due process protections are implicated whenever a person is
229

See supra notes 19–21, 57–58 and accompanying text.

230

See supra Part I.C.

231

See supra Part II.

232

See infra Part III.A.

233

See infra Part III.B.

234

See infra Part III.C.

235

U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

The Fifth Amendment provides that “No person shall . . . . be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. V (providing due process
protections as against the federal government); “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing due
process protections as against the state).
236

424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Court held that qualified individuals have a property right in
social security benefits, and that terminating those benefits is a grievous loss, requiring due process
protections, but not enough to require a pre-termination hearing. Id.
237
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“condemned to suffer a grievous loss of any kind.”238 When the loss is grievous,
due process fundamentally requires an individual be provided an opportunity
to be heard, “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” before such
loss occurs.239
It is important to note that due process is not a rigid concept, but is instead
“flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.”240 To determine what procedural protections are due such that they
provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard, the Court requires consideration
of three distinct factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the
official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the func
tion involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.”241 The public interest must also
be considered in addition to these three factors in reaching an appropriate due
process balance.242

B. A Juvenile’s Liberty Interest in the Juvenile Court, and the Grievous Loss
Suffered when Transferred
When determining whether an individual suffers a grievous loss, courts
do not simply examine the severity of the interest at stake, but also consider
“whether the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the ‘liberty
or property’ language of the [due process clause].”243 While a liberty interest can
“arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word
‘liberty,’” it can also arise “from an expectation or interest created by state laws or
policies.”244 This section elaborates on how a juvenile’s liberty interest in juvenile
court adjudication arises under both contexts,245 and how depriving a juvenile of
this liberty interest condemns him to suffer a grievous loss.246

Id. at 333 (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (emphasis added).
238

239

Id. (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).

240

Id. at 321 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).

241

Id. at 335.

The public interest “includes the administrative burden and other societal costs that
would be associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, an evidentiary hearing . . . .”
Id. at 347.
242

243

Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481.

244

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).

245

See infra Parts III.B.2–3.

246

See infra Part III.B.4.
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1. A Statutorily Created Liberty Interest.
Through creation of statutory expectations, governing bodies create within
their residents certain liberty interests. The United States Supreme Court found
such a statutorily created liberty interest regarding good-time credits for persons
incarcerated in Nebraska state prisons.247 The Court in Wolff v. McDonnell
acknowledged that “the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credits
for satisfactory behavior while in prison,” but that the State “not only provided a
statutory right to good time” for Nebraska prisoners, it also specified “that it is to
be forfeited only for serious misbehavior.”248 The Court held that:
[T]he State having created the right to good time and itself
recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for
major misconduct, the prisoner’s interest has real substance and
is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment ‘liberty’
to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under
the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to
insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.249
The Court emphasized that the “touchstone of due process is protection of the
individual against arbitrary action of government.”250 Since Nebraska prisoners
could “only lose good-time credits if they are guilty of serious misconduct,
the determination of whether such behavior has occurred becomes critical,
and the minimum requirements of procedural due process appropriate for the
circumstances must be observed.”251 Determining whether a juvenile is unfit for
the juvenile courts is similarly “critical,” and thus “the minimum requirements of
procedural due process appropriate for the circumstances must be observed.”252
Similar to the liberty interest of Nebraska prisoners in good-time credits
arising out of state statutes and regulations, the liberty interest of juveniles in
juvenile court adjudication arises primarily from society’s creation of the juvenile
court system and adult court transfer schemes aimed only at the most serious and
violent offenders. The United States and each of the states within it developed
an entirely separate court system for adjudicating juveniles, including a unique
system of probation, detention, and disposition.253 It then developed adult
court transfer schemes aimed at removing from the juvenile courts only the

247

See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1978).

248

Id. at 557.

249

Id.

250

Id. at 558 (citing Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114. 123 (1889)).

251

Id.

252

See id.

253

See supra Part I.A.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol14/iss2/11

34

Hamack: Go Directly to Jail, Do Not Pass Juvenile Court, Do Not Collect D

2014

A Denial of Basic Due Process Rights

809

most serious and violent juvenile offenders who are incapable of rehabilitation
under the juvenile court’s services and programs.254 In doing so, society created
in juveniles “an expectation or interest” for adjudication in juvenile court—an
interest that “has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth
Amendment ‘liberty’ to entitle [them] to those minimum procedures appropriate
under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that
the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.”255 But unlike the Nebraska
prisoners seeking good-time credits, the liberty interest of juveniles in juvenile
court adjudication also arises from the Constitution itself.

2. Liberty Interest Arising from the Constitution
The juvenile’s liberty interest arising from the Constitution comes from the
increased stigmatization and constraint on freedom he suffers when adjudicated
and sentenced in the adult courts as opposed to the juvenile courts. The
Supreme Court found a similar liberty interest in prisoners when transferred to
mental illness facilities.256 In Vitek v. Jones, the Court held that a prisoner has a
constitutional liberty interest, implicit in the guarantees of the word “liberty,”
to avoid involuntary transfer to a mental institution.257 The Court found that
commitment to a mental institution amplifies the stigma attached to the prisoner,
greatly increases the limitations on the prisoner’s freedom of movement in
confinement, and subjects the prisoner to behavioral modification programs.258 If
the state attempts to condemn an ordinary citizen to such a grievous loss of liberty,
due process protections are undoubtedly required.259 The Court recognized that
“a valid criminal conviction and prison sentence extinguish a defendant’s right
to freedom from confinement,” but even a convicted felon is “entitled to the
benefit of procedures appropriate in the circumstances before he is found to have
a mental disease and transferred to a mental hospital.”260
Similarly, when a law enforcement or judicial officer finds probable cause
to believe a juvenile committed a crime, the juvenile will often be placed under
arrest, held in confinement for some period of time, required to appear in court,
etc. As such, the juvenile undoubtedly loses some of his liberty interest in being
free from governmental restraints on his freedom and intrusions on his privacy.
Nevertheless, he is still “entitled to the benefit of procedures appropriate in the

254

See supra Part I.B.

255

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557.

256

See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).

257

Id. at 488.

258

Id. at 491–93.

259

Id. at 491.

260

Id. at 493.
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circumstances” before being found culpable as an adult offender, and subjected to
an adult court system that will greatly stigmatize him and significantly increase his
liberty constraints.

a. Stigmatization
Professor W. David Ball discussed the significance of stigma avoidance as
a liberty interest and its proper Due Process Clause protection.261 Ball defines
stigma using a “modified labeling theory,” suggesting that once labeled an adult
criminal deviant, a juvenile’s desire to manage this shame leads him to “follow
strategies such as withdrawal and secrecy, and it is these reactions which generate
‘secondary deviance.’”262 Secondary deviance thus occurs “[w]hen a person
begins to employ his deviant behavior or a role based upon it as a means of
defense, attack, or adjustment to the overt and covert problems created by the
consequent societal reaction to him.”263 For example, a juvenile labeled by society
as dangerous and incapable of rehabilitation in the juvenile courts will take on
that label as a key aspect of his identity and exhibit behavior in accordance with
that label. The avoidance of secondary deviant behavior—which follows upon
the labeling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination arising from
classification as an incurable adult criminal deviant 264—is a significant liberty
261
See W. David Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In re Winship, Stigma,
and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 38 Am. J. Crim. L. 117 (2011). W. David Ball is a Professor of
Law at Santa Clara University School of Law.
262
Id. at 146 (citing Terri A. Winnick & Mark Bodkin, Anticipated Stigma and Stigma
Management Among Those to be Labeled “Ex-Con”, 29 Deviant Behav. 295, 299–300 (2008)).

Edwin M. Lemert., Social Pathology: Systematic Approaches to the Study of Socio
Behavior 76 (McGraw-Hill 1951).

263

pathic

264

Professor Ball elaborates on the stigmatization process for juveniles convicted of crimes:
The first, labeling, refers to the ways in which salient differences are identified (e.g.,
‘that person is a sex offender’). Link and Phelan use the word ‘label’ rather than
‘attribute’ because these categories are socially constructed. That is, the word ‘attribute’
(perhaps subtly) connotes a quality in the person; a label is something others attach to
the person. The second factor describes how these labels are associated with negative
stereotypes (e.g., ‘sex offenders are incorrigible’). Stereotypes need not fit the label
exactly, nor need they be empirically valid. Invoking a negative set of characteristics is
enough. Third, the stigmatized person is separated, becoming a ‘them’ distinct from
‘us,’ and, in extreme cases, ‘the stigmatized person is thought to be so different from
‘us’ as to be not really human’ (e.g., ‘sex offenders are so incorrigible that they cannot
be reintegrated into society’). Fourth, the now-isolated person suffers status loss, which
refers to changes in life outcomes ‘like income, education, psychological well-being,
housing status, medical treatment, and health’ (e.g., ‘sex offenders are so incorrigible
and incapable of reentry that they cannot live near parks and schools’). The final
component is discrimination, where ‘successful negative labeling and stereotyping
[results in] a general downward placement of a person in a status hierarchy’ (e.g.,
‘sex offenders living under freeway overpasses’). Again, the stigmatized person is not
merely spoken of poorly—she does not and cannot participate meaningfully in society.

See Ball, supra note 261, at 146–47 (internal citations omitted).
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interest demanding due process protection.265 Adjudication in a juvenile court
provides this required protection as it carries less stigmatization for juveniles.
Juvenile courts accomplish this feat through implementing several procedural
protections. In most jurisdictions, juvenile courts close their courtrooms to the
public and the juvenile’s identity is almost never released.266 In contrast, adult
court proceedings are frequently open to the public who can hear every intimate
detail about the defendant’s alleged offense and troubled past. Furthermore, the
defendant’s identifying information in an adult proceeding is available to anyone
willing to exert minimal effort to find it through the court or clerk’s office.267
The procedural protections of the juvenile courts are crucial as the life-long
societal stigma attached to an adult felony conviction in the adult criminal system
carries consequences even beyond secondary deviance, consequences such as
disenfranchisement, diminished employment opportunities, and decreased public
benefits eligibility.268 To protect against these consequences, some states developed
automatic sealing and expungement laws following juvenile court convictions.269
While not automatic, other states crafted more relaxed sealing and expungement
laws for juvenile offenders than laws controlling adult court records.270
This avoidance of stigmatization has not only played a role in state
legislatures crafting sealing and expungement laws, but also in past United States
Supreme Court decisions. Avoiding the heavy stigma of a criminal conviction
was a foundational underpinning for the Court’s holding in In re Winship.271 The
Court in In re Winship held that all criminal adjudications, including juvenile
court trials, must operate under the “beyond a reasonable doubt standard.”272

Professor Ball further explains that “[j]uvenile delinquents are more comfortable among
similarly stigmatized people away from the ‘righteous gaze’ of parents, and they structure
their lives to avoid the uneasiness, embarrassment, and ambiguity of interactions with nondelinquents; interactions that require ‘intense efforts at impression management.’” Id. at 147
(internal citations omitted).
265

266

See Yeckel, supra note 44, at 335.

See, e.g., The Superior Court of California: Cnty. of Santa Clara, Criminal Case Records,
(last visited May 2, 2014), available at http://www.scscourt.org/self_help/criminal/viewing_crim_
records.shtml.
267

268
See generally Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of
Mass Conviction, 160 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1789 (2012).
269
See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62H.140 (West 2013) (stating “[e]xcept as otherwise provided
in NRS 62H.150, when a child reaches 21 years of age, all records relating to the child must be
sealed automatically.”).
270

See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 13.50.050 (West 2013).

271

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970).

272

Id. at 363.
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Recognizing just how devastating stigmatization attached to a conviction is, the
Supreme Court hedged against wrongful convictions using the highest burden of
proof it could impose on trial courts, ensuring the accompanying stigmatization
is attached only when a heavy evidentiary showing is made.273
These procedures, statutes, and holdings all indicate just how critical stigma
management is for juveniles within the criminal justice system. Such recognition
leads logically to the conclusion that stigma avoidance is indeed a significant
liberty interest for all juveniles in our criminal justice system. Thus, when
transferring juveniles into the adult court system—a procedure greatly increasing
their chances of lifelong stigmatization—due process protections are required to
protect that interest.

b. Liberty Constraints
A person’s liberty is, in essence, a person’s freedom to control his or her own
actions. Liberty constraints on juveniles during proceedings and after dispositions
in juvenile court are greatly relaxed and geared toward increased social and family
interaction, education, and rehabilitation. An individual adjudicated in the adult
criminal justice system is not so fortunate, as he will be met with exponentially
larger bail amounts and greater incarceration exposure in over-crowded and
under-serviced facilities.
Juvenile courts generally place few constraints on a juvenile’s liberty while
under the court’s jurisdiction relative to the restraints placed on defendants in
the adult court system. After an initial post-arrest hearing, instead of being held
in confinement, a juvenile will most likely be released into the custody of his
parent or guardian under conditions of release (e.g., perfect school attendance,
obeying house rules, counseling, community service, restitution, etc.).274 To
hold a minor in detention, a judge often must find, among other things, that
confinement is immediately necessary for the protection of the juvenile or the
public, or that there is sufficient reason to believe the juvenile will not appear at
future court hearings.275 Some states, Washington for example, allow judges to
place low bail amounts on juveniles, amounts easily affordable to the juvenile’s
parents or guardian.276

273

Id. at 367.

See King county Juvenile court: Juvenile Justice 101, King county Juvenile Justice
Resource Booklet 25, available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/~/media/courts/JuvenileCourt/
documents/JJ101Book.ashx.
274

275
See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 628(a), 635 (West 2013); see also Wash. Rev. Code
§ 13.40.040(2)(a)(ii)-(iii) (West 2013).
276

Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.040(5) (West 2013).
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The relaxed constraints on juveniles also extend to the disposition phase.
Once a juvenile court finds a juvenile delinquent, the juvenile is most often placed
on probation with conditions of release similar to those placed on him in the
pre-disposition phase,277 with added requirements such as community service
hours and orders of restitution.278 In only about one of every four cases will the
juvenile be placed in an out-of-home facility such as a foster home, group home,
residential treatment facility, or detention center.279
The chance a juvenile ends up in secured detention is rare; only about 30%
of the facilities used to house out-of-home placements of juveniles are secured
detention centers.280 And unless a juvenile is a serial recidivist or committed a
serious or violent crime, sentences to such facilities are often for relatively short
durations.281 Moreover, while confined, juveniles spend most of the day outside
their cell interacting with others, participating in rehabilitation programs, and
attending classes.282 Because a vast majority of juvenile confinement facilities
277
In 2009, a national study found that 60% of juveniles who had been adjudicated as
delinquents were placed on some form of probation. See The Nat’l Center for Juv. Just. Juvenile
Court Statistics 2009, 55 (2012), available at http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/jcsreports/jcs2009.pdf.
278
See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 202(e)-(f ) (West 2013) (“As used in this chapter,
‘punishment’ means the imposition of sanctions. It does not include retribution and shall not
include a court order to place a child in foster care as defined by Section 727.3. Permissible sanctions
may include any of the following: (1) Payment of a fine by the minor. (2) Rendering of compul
sory service without compensation performed for the benefit of the community by the minor.
(3) Limitations on the minor’s liberty imposed as a condition of probation or parole. (4) Commitment
of the minor to a local detention or treatment facility, such as a juvenile hall, camp, or ranch.
(5) Commitment of the minor to the Division of Juvenile Facilities, Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation . . . the juvenile court may, as appropriate, direct the offender to complete a
victim impact class, participate in victim offender conferencing subject to the victim’s consent, pay
restitution to the victim or victims, and make a contribution to the victim restitution fund after all
victim restitution orders and fines have been satisfied, in order to hold the offender accountable or
restore the victim or community.”).
279
In 2009, Courts ordered out-of-home placements in only 27% of cases where a juvenile
had been adjudicated as a delinquent. See Juvenile Court Statistics 2009, supra note 277, at 51.
280
A national study conducted in 2008 found that only 734 out of a total of 2,458 juvenile
housing facilities—about 30%—were considered secure detention centers. The rest were classified
as shelters, reception/diagnostic centers, group homes, ranch/wilderness camps, training schools,
and residential treatment centers. See Sarah Hockenberry, et al, Juvenile Residential Facility Census,
2008: Selected Findings, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 3 (2011),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/231683.pdf.
281
See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.0357 (2013). In King County, Washington, the average
length of stay for all juvenile offenders in secured confinement was five to ten days in 2013, for adult
offenders it was over twenty days. See King County Dep’t of Adult and Juvenile Detention,
Detention and Alternatives Report, (Dec. 2013), available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/~/media/
courts/detention/documents/KC_DAR_12_2013.ashx.
282

While juveniles are detained, they receive
medical and mental health services, and are provided education through Seattle Public
Schools, which maintains two school programs at the Youth Service Center. There
is also a library on site that is maintained and staff through contracts with the King
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operate within their capacity, juveniles are provided sufficient access to education,
medical staff, and confinement within uncrowded living quarters.283
In contrast, defendants in the adult criminal courts are routinely confined
to crowded county jail facilities,284 and held on bail amounts reaching into the
hundreds of thousands of dollars which greatly reduces the possibility of release.285
Following conviction in an adult court, a juvenile is often confined either in
county jail or state prison depending on the crime and sentence length.286 In
either case, the juvenile can expect to spend copious amounts of time in his cell
and should expect very little, if anything, in the way of rehabilitative programs,
counseling sessions, or educational opportunities.287 Furthermore, in many cases,
the conditions of county jails and state prisons have deteriorated significantly due
to massive overcrowding and budget shortfalls.288 The California prison system,
for example, was held unconstitutional for subjecting its inmates to cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment due to issues stemming
from overcrowding.289
Along with the statutorily created liberty interest in juveniles of juvenile
court adjudication, the great increase in stigmatization and restraint on freedom
when transferred to the adult courts create a similar liberty interest arising from
the Constitution itself under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by reason
of guarantees implicit in the word “liberty.” Because the juvenile suffers such a

County Library System. Youth are scheduled in the library on a regular basis. Youth
also have the option of participating in other regularly scheduled programs such as AA
and NA meetings, Powerful Voices, and other special programs.
King Cnty Dep’t. of Adult and Juvenile Detention, King Cnty. Juvenile Detention (Feb. 13,
2013), available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/courts/detention/juvenile_detention.aspx.
Only 6% of private and public juvenile confinement facilities in 2008 reported operating
in excess of their bed capacity. See Hockenberry et al., supra note 280, at 7.
283

See generally Todd D. Minton, Jail Inmates at Midyear 2011—Statistical Tables, United
States Department of Justice: Bureau of Justice Statistics (April 2012), available at http://bjs.
gov/content/pub/pdf/jim11st.pdf.
284

See, e.g., Superior Court of California, Cnty. of Orange, Uniform Bail Schedule
(Felony and Misdemeanor) (2013), available at http://www.occourts.org/directory/criminal/
felonybailsched.pdf.
285

286
Kimberly Burke, All Grown Up: Juveniles Incarcerated in Adult Facilities, 25 J. Juv. L. 69,
71 (2005).

J.M. Kirby, Graham, Miller, & the Right to Hope, 15 CUNY L. Rev. 149, 161–62 (2011).
(“In the years following the loss of Pell grants, a significant number of other rehabilitative and
educational programs in prisons were cut, including vocational and technical training and even
some secondary schools as imprisonment increased and state and federal funding decreased.”).
287

288
See, e.g., Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of California, Prison Overcrowding State of
Emergency Proclamation (Oct. 4, 2006), available at http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=4278.
289

See generally Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
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grievous loss when the government deprives him of this constitutionally protected
liberty interest, due process protections are required to guard against arbitrary and
erroneous deprivation.

3. Transfer to the Adult Criminal System Condemns Juveniles to Suffer
a Grievous Loss
The loss a juvenile suffers when deprived of his liberty interest in juvenile
court adjudication is epitomized when the requirements and consequences
of juvenile court adjudication are contrasted against those of adult court
adjudication. Adult court adjudication subjects juveniles to a great risk of secured
confinement, immense psychological pressures, and devastating direct and
collateral consequences. In comparison, the juvenile courts feature rehabilitative
and uniquely juvenile focused procedures and dispositions geared towards their
unique characteristics and traits. The disastrous change in circumstances when a
juvenile is transferred into the adult courts can only be categorized as a grievous
loss,290 a consequence appropriately described by the California Supreme Court
as “the worst punishment the juvenile system is empowered to inflict.”291

a. Adult Proceedings, Dispositions, and Collateral Consequences
As previously discussed, adult criminal proceedings and dispositions feature
very little, if any, of the rehabilitative focused programs and services offered in the
juvenile court system.292 What they feature instead is an increase in confinement,
collateral consequences, and psychological pressures.
Just as juveniles are more susceptible to the increased pressures of custodial
interrogations, as recognized in J.D.B.,293 they are much more susceptible to the
authoritative pressures of adult criminal proceedings. The judicial/legal culture
of adult court proceedings—already confusing for the majority of adults who
undergo them—are much more incomprehensible to juveniles than juvenile court

290
The Court found a similar grievous loss when a parolee has his parole revoked under
certain statutory schemes. In Morrissey v. Brewer, the Court found that under a statutory scheme
giving a presumption of parole, only to be revoked on a fact-finding, a parolee has a state created
liberty interest in being on parole, and suffers a grievous loss when his parole is revoked. The Court
recognized that parole was a state created system for prisoners who demonstrate certain qualities
which qualify them to undergo parole supervision free from prison confinement. Even though the
state subjects a parolee to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens due to his criminal
conviction, he still enjoys conditions of liberty very different from that of a prisoner in confinement.
408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
291

Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 802, 810 (2011).

292

See supra Part III.B.3.b.

293

See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2012).
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proceedings.294 Juveniles have a relatively poor understanding of the trial process,
such as differentiating between arraignment, pre-trial motion and bail hearings,
and trial; have difficulty grasping abstract legal concepts and terminology such
as “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” and “self-incrimination”; have trouble
separating the functions of their defense attorney from the authority of the court;
and have a lesser capability to properly comprehend the consequences of decisions
such as pleading guilty and choosing to testify.295 To combat this problem, many
juvenile court judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and probation officers dealing
with juvenile defendants on a daily basis receive special training geared toward the
specialized needs of juvenile offenders, and further grow accustomed to the unique
traits and characteristics of juveniles through their continuous work within the
juvenile courts.296 Moreover, while juvenile court proceedings are fashioned as
civil in nature with all parties working together to achieve the best interest of the
juvenile, adult court proceedings are known for their combative and adversarial
nature.297 Adult court proceedings lack a juvenile court judge more “vigilant in
protecting juveniles from the retributionist leanings of prosecutors.”298
Not only are the psychological pressures greater, but the potential for pretrial detention, as well as the length and conditions of confinement, are far more
severe for juveniles in the adult court system. Almost half the juveniles transferred
into the adult courts are held in pre-trial detention.299 Following their criminal
proceedings, 72% of juveniles convicted of violent offenses end up in adult

294
See Thomas F. Geraghty, Justice for Children: How Do We Get There?, 88 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 190, 222 (1997). Irene Rosenberg, Professor of Law, Emeritus at the University of
Houston Law center, stated that she could not “believe that the proverbial visitor from Mars, if
plunked down in the juvenile courts and the criminal courts, and asked to determine which would
be better in terms of protecting children, would not conclude that the juvenile courts were far
superior.” Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court
Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 163, 185 n.66 (1993).
295
Geraghty, supra note 294, at 222, 226–27. While the Constitution would require the
appointment of counsel for any juvenile placed in adult criminal proceedings, see Gideon v.
Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), even adults who have the assistance of counsel find the adult
criminal justice system incredibly confusing and intimidating, undoubtedly a juvenile would find
the system daunting.
296
See, e.g., GA R UNIF JUV CT Rule 1.5 (West 2014) (“Each person serving as juvenile
court judge or associate juvenile court judge shall attend a new judge orientation program
established by the Council of Juvenile Court Judges . . . and presented in conjunction with the
Institute of Continuing Judicial Education.”); NC R CATAWBA CTY JUV Rule 5 (West 2014)
(“The Chief District Court Judge shall from time to time arrange for and schedule training sessions
for judges, court counselors, attorneys, social workers, guardians ad litem and other professionals
who participate on a regular basis in juvenile court matters.”).
297

Geraghty, supra note 294, at 225.

298

Id.

See Gerard A. Rainville, Steven K. Smith, Juvenile Felony Defendants in Criminal
Courts, United States Department of Justice: Bureau of Justice Statistics 3 (May 2003),
available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jfdcc98.pdf.
299
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incarceration, with non-violent offenses carrying incarceration rates from 47 to
60%.300 Regardless of the offense classification, juveniles convicted of felonies in
the adult criminal system usually receive sentences of seven to eight years.301
The increased physical and psychological pressures of adult confinement,
combined with a much more violent and abusive atmosphere, create devastating
consequences on juveniles. Juveniles confined in county jails and state prisons face
a high risk of physical and sexual abuse by both inmates and guards,302 and commit
suicide at a much greater rate than those in juvenile detention facilities.303 “Given
their incomplete development, juveniles are significantly impacted by the lack of
appropriate services and care in adult facilities.”304 In contrast, juvenile detention
facilities are much better equipped “to provide developmentally appropriate
healthcare, rehabilitative services, and programming” than adult facilities.305 But
even more devastating than what the juvenile is subjected to in the adult criminal
justice system, is what he is forced to give up.

b. Deprivation of the Opportunity to Rehabilitate
A juvenile transferred to the adult court system is deprived of the rehabilitative
services and programs offered by the juvenile court system—programs and
services designed specifically for juveniles like him. He is instead shoehorned into
an already overcrowded adult criminal system where the focus is almost solely
on the charged crime, instead of the individual standing before the court.306
“Grievous loss” is the only appropriate description for the impact on juveniles
denied adjudication in the juvenile courts and transferred into adult criminal
justice systems.307 When a juvenile is deprived of his liberty interest, he suffers

Property offenses: 59 percent; drug offenses: 47.3 percent; public-order offenses: 58.9
percent; and misdemeanors: 59.8 percent. Id. at 9.
300

301

Id. at 6.

See Andrea Wood, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Confining Juveniles with
Adults After Graham and Miller, 61 Emory L.J. 1445, 1450 (2012).
302

303
“One study indicates that a juvenile housed in an adult jail is five times more likely to
commit suicide than is a juvenile in the general population and eight times more likely to commit
suicide than is a juvenile housed in a juvenile facility.” Id. at 1454.
304
305

Id. at 1455 (emphasis added).
Id. Andrea Wood elaborates further:
Adult facilities may fail to provide juveniles with the appropriate nutrition or dental
and vision care, which are especially critical for developing adolescents. Staff members
at juvenile facilities typically receive special training to work with juveniles not
generally received by the staff at adult facilities. Many adult facilities fail to provide
juveniles with even basic services, including prison-survival skills and counseling.

Id.
306

See supra Part I.C.

307

See supra notes 252–95 and accompanying text.
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a grievous loss, and thus deserves the full protections of the Constitution’s Due
Process Clause.

C. Due Process Demands a Full Fitness Hearing Before Transfer to Adult
Criminal Systems
Because juveniles have a liberty interest in juvenile court adjudication and
deprivation of that interest causes them to suffer a grievous loss, due process
protections are required. Forty years ago in his dissent to denying certiorari in
Bland, Justice Douglas mulled over the question of what protections are due
before the state can constitutionally deprive a juvenile of this liberty interest: “A
juvenile or ‘child’ is placed in a more protected position than an adult, not by the
Constitution but by [the laws and policies of the jurisdiction]. In that category
he is theoretically subject to rehabilitative treatment.”308 Following a juvenile’s
placement in a more protected position, “[c]an he [then] be put in the class of the
run-of-the-mill criminal defendant, without any hearing, without any chance to
be heard, without an opportunity to rebut the evidence against him, without a
chance of showing that he is being given an invidiously different treatment than
others in his group?”309
The Eldridge factors provide a guide for answering this question.310 These
factors, as applied to juveniles, are (1) the juvenile’s interest in being adjudicated
in the juvenile courts; (2) the necessity of a fitness hearing; and (3) the interests
of the state and the public. Upon consideration of these factors, Justice Douglas’s
question has only one logical answer, and the Court already answered it in Kent:
“there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous
consequences without ceremony—without hearing, without effective assistance
of counsel, without a statement of reasons.”311

1. The Juvenile’s Interest in Juvenile Court Adjudication
The first Eldridge factor is “the private interest that will be affected by the
official action.”312 A juvenile’s private interest is clear: to be adjudicated in the
rehabilitative focused juvenile courts where he can reform through programs
and services catered to his developing character,313 instead of the adult courts
where he will be subjected to increased stigmatization, constraints on his freedom,
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Bland v. United States, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909, 911 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Id.
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See supra Part III.A.1.
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Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
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Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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See supra Parts III.B.1-2.
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and direct and collateral consequences.314 A juvenile’s private interest further
incorporates being heard as to why he is amenable to the juvenile court’s programs
and services, before being labeled incapable of rehabilitation and transferred into
the adult criminal justice system.
While the “get tough” era allowed the concept of punishment to creep into
the juvenile court system, the system’s overarching purpose, whenever possible,
remains rehabilitating delinquents.315 When a juvenile court punishes a juvenile,
many state legislatures limit punishments to sanctions,316 or allow punishment
only after weighing the potential punishment against multiple other important
considerations—taking into account all the individual and unique characteristics
of the juvenile.317 A juvenile retains a significant interest in being adjudicated
within the juvenile justice system even with its current deficiencies; especially
when the alternative is an adult criminal system focusing almost exclusively on
punishment and incapacitation.

314

See supra Part III.B.

See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 202(b) (West 2013) (“Minors under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court who are in need of protective services shall receive care, treatment, and guidance
consistent with their best interest and the best interest of the public. Minors under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct shall, in conformity with the interests
of public safety and protection, receive care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their
best interest, that holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their
circumstances. This guidance may include punishment that is consistent with the rehabilitative
objectives of this chapter. If a minor has been removed from the custody of his or her parents, family
preservation and family reunification are appropriate goals for the juvenile court to consider when
determining the disposition of a minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence
of delinquent conduct when those goals are consistent with his or her best interests and the best
interests of the public. When the minor is no longer a ward of the juvenile court, the guidance he
or she received should enable him or her to be a law-abiding and productive member of his or her
family and the community.”).
315

See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 202(e) (West 2013) (“As used in this chapter,
‘punishment’ means the imposition of sanctions. It does not include retribution . . . .”).
316

See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code. § 13.40.010(2) (West 2013) (“It is the intent of the legislature
that a system capable of having primary responsibility for, being accountable for, and responding to
the needs of youthful offenders and their victims, as defined by this chapter, be established. It is the
further intent of the legislature that youth, in turn, be held accountable for their offenses and that
communities, families, and the juvenile courts carry out their functions consistent with this intent.
To effectuate these policies, the legislature declares the following to be equally important purposes of
this chapter: (a) Protect the citizenry from criminal behavior; (b) Provide for determining whether
accused juveniles have committed offenses as defined by this chapter; (c) Make the juvenile offender
accountable for his or her criminal behavior; (d) Provide for punishment commensurate with the
age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile offender; (e) Provide due process for juveniles alleged
to have committed an offense; (f ) Provide necessary treatment, supervision, and custody for juvenile
offenders; (g) Provide for the handling of juvenile offenders by communities whenever consistent
with public safety; (h) Provide for restitution to victims of crime . . . .”).
317
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2. The Necessity of a Fitness Hearing
The second Eldridge factor is “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards[.]”318 As the Court explained in
Roper, “[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the
juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and
the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”319 It is
impossible to estimate just how many juveniles are automatically waived into the
adult criminal system without any opportunity to be heard who are otherwise
capable of successful rehabilitation within the juvenile court system.
Proper due process protections are required to ensure the risk of erroneous
deprivation of a juvenile’s interest in juvenile court adjudication is kept
significantly low. The only attempt at differentiation made by automatic transfer
and prosecutorial waiver laws is based primarily on the offender’s age, the crime
allegedly committed, and occasionally a juvenile’s delinquency history.320 If the
standard for due process protections is an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner, than automatic transfer and prosecutorial
waiver laws exemplify procedures completely devoid of due process. Such transfer
laws lack any individualized consideration of the offender or the circumstances
surrounding his crime and background. Because no attempt to determine the
juvenile’s ability to rehabilitate occurs, the risk of erroneous deprivation of juvenile
court rehabilitative services to juveniles amenable of rehabilitation is enormous.
To prevent a risk of erroneous deprivation, a fitness hearing provides a
meaningful way for juveniles to be heard before any potential transfer occurs. At
a fitness hearing, the state can present its case as to why it believes the juvenile
is beyond the help of the juvenile court system.321 Furthermore, probation
officers and counselors usually must present investigative findings regarding the
circumstances surrounding the juvenile’s crime and his background.322 Most
importantly, the juvenile can testify, presenting evidence as to why he is amenable
to the juvenile court’s rehabilitative programs and services, thus providing him a
meaningful opportunity to be heard before a potential transfer.323
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Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
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See supra Part I.C.
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Additionally, when the court provides a statement of reasons for a finding of
unfitness, the juvenile has the opportunity to appeal the judicial determination.324
In contrast, there is no opportunity for a juvenile to appeal a legislative waiver or
mandatory judicial waiver.325 There are also extremely narrow grounds for appeal
on prosecutorial waivers since courts give significant deference to prosecutorial
discretion.326 The finality of a transfer to adult courts under these waiver schemes,
combined with the enormous risk of erroneous deprivation, proves just how
necessary a fitness hearing is in the transfer process.

3. The Interests of the State
The third Eldridge factor is “the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”327 The Government
undoubtedly has penological interests aimed at protecting public safety. But laws
transferring juveniles to adult criminal systems absent a fitness hearing are not
only unnecessary to achieve this interest, but actually contradict it. These laws
increase the frequency of secondary deviant behavior due to stigmatization,328
and turn juveniles capable of reform into more hardened criminals.329 The impact
on the Government’s administrative and fiscal burdens following a full fitness
hearing requirement, however, is less clear.

a. The Penological Interests of the State
To advance penological interests, states have enacted automatic transfer and
prosecutorial waiver laws—believing that harsher consequences are needed to
324

See Klein, supra note 45, at 389.
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Id.
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As John D. Burrow points out:
Another criticism of prosecutorial waiver is that such decisions, for the most part,
are non-appealable. It is alleged no process is in place wherein the decisions of the
prosecutor can be reviewed to ensure the case has no factual errors. The lack of review
may be attributable to the traditionally wide latitude given to prosecutors in their
charging decisions. This argument is grounded in the belief that because prosecutors
possess so much latitude, there should be some mechanism for review. Further, it
is alleged that prosecutorial waiver expands the traditional function of prosecutors.
Moreover, some believe discretion in charging decisions is a necessary part of
prosecutors’ jobs, it must still be structured and constrained. Allowing prosecutors
wide latitude in deciding the forum for prosecution unnecessarily expands this
discretion without the benefit of checks and balances.

John D. Burrow, Punishing Serious Juvenile Offenders: A Case Study of Michigan’s Prosecutorial Waiver
Statute, 9 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 1, 20–21 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
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Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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329

See infra Part III.C.3.c.
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punish, deter, and incapacitate violent juvenile offenders.330 But as the Court
recognized in Graham, the penological interests of retribution, deterrence, and
incapacitation apply quite differently to juvenile offenders,331 and moreover are
already prevalent within the juvenile court system.
While society is entitled to impose punishment on serious juvenile offenders,
such punishment must be “directly related to the personal culpability of the
criminal offender.”332 Transfer to the adult criminal system cannot be related to
the personal culpability of a juvenile offender if no hearing is held to determine
his level of culpability. The only way to fairly punish a juvenile for being a serious
and violent offender through adult sentencing is to hold a hearing and perform an
investigation to determine if his culpability truly warrants such punishment. For
most juvenile offenders, society’s entitlement to impose punishment on juvenile
offenders is adequately achieved through juvenile court adjudication.
When confined following juvenile court adjudication to a juvenile detention
facility for a period of weeks, months, or years, it is misguided to claim a juvenile
is not being “punished.” As previously stated, the concept of punishment has crept
its way into the juvenile justice system.333 Many detained juveniles are required
to wear department issued clothing signifying their confined status, and in some
states they must wear handcuffs and leg shackles when transported to and from
the courtroom.334 Their living quarters commonly consist of white brick walls,
gray concrete floors, small windows, and recreation yards surrounded by barbed
wire fences.335
One of the most common misconceptions is that confinement in secured
juvenile detention facilities does not constitute punishment because facilities are
referred to as camps, ranches, guidance centers, reformatory schools, rehabilitation
facilities, etc. In response to an accusation that commitment to an “industrial
school,” a form of secured juvenile detention, was not punishment, the California
Supreme Court stated “it certainly does not come under the classification of
pleasure. Calling a reformatory an ‘industrial school’ does not mitigate its

330

See supra Part I.C.

331

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).

332

Id. at 71.

333

See supra Part I.C.

See generally Bernard P. Perlmutter, “Unchain the Children”: Gault, Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
and Shackling, 9 Barry L. Rev. 1 (2007). Keep in mind the juvenile is still behind closed doors at all
times and cameras are not allowed inside juvenile courtrooms. So while a juvenile may feel like he is
being confined, the social stigma does not apply as it would in an open adult criminal proceeding.
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bleakness, loneliness and destitution of parental love and care.”336 The California
Supreme Court further opined:
What is punishment? It is the infliction of pain, sorrow, and
grief. To take a child from the comfort of his home, the joy of
his companions and the freedom of field, river and wood, and
confine him to a building with whitewashed walls regimented
routine and institutional hours is punishment in the strictest
sense of the word. To say, as the Commonwealth says, that this
institutionalized incarceration is ‘for the care and treatment’ of
the juvenile does not make it any less abhorrent to the boy of
spirit, health and energy.’337
Deterrence is also not a sufficient penological justification to support
directly filing juvenile cases in adult court. Using the threat of adult court
adjudication as a widespread deterrent ignores the fact that, due to their lack of
maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility, juveniles are less likely than
adults to consider potential punishment when making decisions.338 Just as the
limited deterrent effect of LWOPP is insufficient to justify imposing LWOPP
sentences on juveniles,339 neither is any de minimis deterrent effect of adult court
adjudication sufficient to justify depriving a juvenile’s liberty interest in juvenile
court adjudication.
Moreover, juvenile courts already have a deterrence effect. Juvenile courts
have the power to place juveniles on strict probation, order them to perform
community service hours, impose orders of restitution, and even place juveniles
into confinement away from their friends, family, and community for years.340
For proponents of adult court transfers as a form of punishment, the deterrence
resulting from the threat of adult prosecution still exists under a mandatory
fitness hearing scheme. This is because prosecutors would still retain the ability
to file motions to transfer juveniles to the adult criminal justice system per
judicial waiver.

336
Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 802, 811 (2011) (citing In re Holmes, 109 A.2d
523, 530 (1954)). Pointing out the bleakness of secured juvenile confinement appears to contradict
portions of this article, but that is not the case. First, only a very select few juveniles should be
subjected to secured confinement under such conditions—those that have proven they are beyond
saving and are a serious risk to the public safety. Second, while a juvenile confinement facility
may be cold, bleak, and lonely, it still does not suffer from the high levels of violent, abusive, and
inhumane conditions that flood our over-crowded adult prison system.
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Finally, incapacitation is an insufficient justification for transferring juveniles
into the adult criminal system absent a fitness hearing. If a juvenile poses a
serious enough risk to public safety meriting incapacitation, juvenile courts have
the power to confine him in a juvenile detention facility, sometimes until many
years past the age of eighteen.341 Furthermore, states are capable of incapacitating
truly dangerous juveniles for as long as possible in rehabilitative focused juvenile
detention facilities, followed by extended periods of incarceration in adult
facilities, without having to transfer the juvenile into the adult court system.342
Increased threat of adjudication in the adult criminal system fails to advance
the states penological interests.343 Those interests are better served by returning
to the originally developed method of transfer—the judicial waiver scheme. This
scheme maintains what de minimis deterrent effect threat of adult transfer has, but
also prevents risks to public safety arising from mass transfers of juveniles to adult
courts, jails, and prisons.

b. The Administrative and Fiscal Burdens
If courts are required to provide full fitness hearings every time the state
requests juvenile transfer to the adult criminal system, administrative costs will
See Department of Juvenile Justice, California Department of Corrections & Reha
(April 16, 2013) http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Juvenile_Justice/. (“The Division of Juvenile
Justice provides education and treatment to California’s youthful offenders up to the age of 25 who
have the most serious criminal backgrounds and most intense treatment needs.”).
341

bilitation

342

This is an example of blended sentencing:
Blended sentencing statutes first came into effect in the early 1990’s. The concept of
blended sentencing is an innovative way to combine the original aims of the juvenile
court system, namely rehabilitation, with the retributive goals of punishment. There
are several different models, but what is common to all of them is the ability to consider
both juvenile and/or adult sentences. For example, one model allows the judge to
impose both a juvenile sentence and an adult sentence. At the end of the juvenile
sentence, the juvenile is reevaluated. If the juvenile is deemed rehabilitated, then the
judge will stay the adult sentence. If not, the juvenile then serves his adult sentence in
an adult correctional facility. There is no one set type of blended sentencing statute.
Other blended sentencing statutes only allow the judge a choice of which type of
sentence he or she wishes to impose, i.e. either juvenile or adult. There are various
models that differ among the states. The different models vary as to which venue the
juvenile is prosecuted in and which judge imposes the sentence.

Kristin L. Caballero, Blended Sentencing: A Good Idea for Juvenile Sex Offenders?, 19 St. John’s J.
Legal Comment. 379, 412–14 (2005).
A heavily publicized case in Snohomish County, Washington several years ago provides an
example of blended sentencing in action. Instead of arguing over whether or not to charge a fifteenyear-old girl as an adult, the lawyers for both sides “reached an agreement to send the teen to
juvenile detention until she turns 21 and then to an adult prison for 100 more months . . . .” See
Snohomish County teen sentenced in school stabbings, The Seattle Times (March 7, 2012), available
at http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2017693397_stabbing08.html.
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See supra notes 316–25 and accompanying text.
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increase as judges, prosecutors, public defenders, bailiffs, court clerks, and court
reporters all need to be present. But these cost increases are offset by the positive
collateral effects of providing such hearings. The most obvious cost offsets are
a probable reduction in the amount of case requests for transfer to the adult
criminal system.344 If prosecutors must actually prove why a juvenile should be
transferred, logically the amount of case requests for transfer will decrease due to
prosecutorial office resource constraints.
Moreover, the adult court transfer was created for only the most serious
recidivist violent juvenile offenders—those juveniles demonstrating an incapacity
for rehabilitation within juvenile courts.345 Currently, many of the cases waived
without fitness hearings are recidivist property offenders and first-time violent
offenders.346 Requiring prosecutors to truly assess individual situations and
prioritize which juveniles pose the largest public-safety risks will bring the adult
court transfer scheme back in line with its original purpose.
With an initial increase in staffing and facilities requirements, followed by
an offset due to a decrease in transfer requests, the Government’s exact long-term
administrative and fiscal burden remains unclear. One conclusion that is clearer,
however, is that the state’s interest in public safety would be better served by
requiring mandatory fitness hearings for adult court transfers.

c. Transfers Absent a Fitness Hearing are Contrary to the State’s
Interest in Public Safety
For the many juveniles transferred into the adult criminal system who still
have strong potential for reform, county jails and state prisons only turn them into
more hardened criminals, with an increased likelihood of reengaging in criminal
activity upon release.347 A task force supported by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention evaluated a series of studies conducted on groups of juveniles
housed in county jails and state prisons, as well as those detained in juvenile
detention facilities.348 The study found that transferred juveniles were more likely
than those housed in juvenile detention facilities to commit more violent and

344
Obviously this is only true if juvenile court proceedings are less expensive than adult court
proceedings. Further research is needed to determine whether or not this true. But findings of
several studies show that the cost to incarcerate a person in a juvenile facility is higher than the cost
to incarcerate a person in an adult facility.
345
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cumulative crime, and were 33.7% more likely to be re-arrested.349 “The task
force concluded that ‘juveniles transferred to the adult justice system have greater
rates of subsequent violence than juveniles retained in the juvenile justice system’
and that ‘[t]ransferring juveniles to the adult justice system is counterproductive
as a strategy for deterring subsequent violence.’”350 This finding comports with
earlier studies conducted in Florida and New York.351 The state’s interest in public
safety is better served by making sure all juveniles capable of reform have the
opportunity to do so through rehabilitative services offered by juvenile courts.
This interest is not served by using county jails and state prisons as factories
turning delinquent children into criminal adults.
Ultimately, the interest of the state should be ensuring juvenile delinquents
capable of rehabilitation get every opportunity to do so. Requiring mandatory
fitness hearings for adult court transfers best protects this interest. Such a
requirement would likely increase the state’s administrative and fiscal burdens,
but given the benefits of a full hearing requirement, this increase is a small price
to pay.

4. The Public Interest
Finally, under the third Eldridge factor, the public interest must be
considered.352 While most people would not want to shoulder the increased cost
burden of mandatory fitness hearings prior to adult court transfers, the end goal of

349

Id. at 1456 –57. This is most likely because the juvenile’s
developmental stage and malleability make [him] particularly vulnerable to criminal
socialization when incarcerated with adults . . . . [J]uveniles confined in adult facilities
are ‘especially likely to engage in violent behavior and to develop identities linked to
domination and control.’ While confined in adult facilities, juveniles lack models for
building a positive identity, honing productive life skills, and solving problems and
disputes. Rather, juveniles may spend considerable amounts of time with experienced
adult offenders, who may pass along new methods and techniques related to criminal
activity and the avoidance of detection . . . . To survive the violence they encounter
in adult facilities, juveniles have reported that they often attempt to fit in to inmate
culture. Many juveniles can only adjust to life in adult prisons or jails by ‘accepting
violence as a part of daily life and, thus, becoming even more violent.’

Id. at 1455–57.
350

Id. at 1457.

The studies “conclusively showed that, contrary to the intentions of legislators who push
for transfer provisions, transferred youth, even if incarcerated for longer periods of time, display
a significantly higher rate of recidivism in a shorter time following incarceration than similarly
situated youth who were not transferred.” Klein, supra note 45, at 403 (citing Donna M. Bishop
et al., The Transfer to Criminal Court: Does It Make a Difference?, 42 Crime & Delinq. 171, 183
(1996)); see also Jeffrey Fagan, Separating the Men From the Boys: The Comparative Advantage of
Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Offenders, in A Sourcebook:
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creating more productive law-abiding members of society is universally agreeable.
This end goal is achievable by keeping juveniles in a juvenile court system created
to rehabilitate them, not by diverting them into an adult court system that turns
juveniles perfectly capable of reform into hardened criminals.
At the dawn of the twentieth century, the public desired to save the children
of the United States from its callous and harsh adult criminal justice system,
and to divert them into a juvenile justice system focused on rehabilitating and
saving them.353 Despite the fact that since then over-sensationalized fear has led
to certain get tough policies,354 common sense tells us that the public still has an
interest in rehabilitating juveniles capable of rehabilitation, and only placing the
most serious violent offenders—those incapable of rehabilitation—in the adult
criminal system. As the public, and the Court, become increasingly aware of the
numerous scientific studies justifying creation of the juvenile court system,355 that
interest will only continue to grow.

Conclusion
State and federal legislatures created the juvenile court system because they
understood that juvenile offenders are different—they have a decreased level
of criminal culpability and are much more amenable to rehabilitative services.
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed these understandings in
Roper, Graham, J.D.B., and Miller, with J.D.B. and Miller further adding that the
unique characteristics of juvenile offenders—their immaturity, susceptibility to
external influences, and transitory and unformed characters—demand increased
individualized procedural protections under the United States Constitution.356
The Court, however, has yet to correct one of the most harmful violations taking
place against juveniles in jurisdictions all across the United States—the deprivation
of due process of law.
In creating a court system designed exclusively for the unique developmental
and cognitive characteristics of juvenile offenders with the goal of rehabilitation
over punishment, society created for juveniles a liberty interest in adjudication
within the juvenile court system.357 Furthermore, this liberty interest arises out of
the Constitution itself due to the increased liberty constraints and stigmatization
juveniles incur when transferred into the adult court system.358
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Once we as a society categorically place a juvenile in a protected position,
we cannot then rip him out of that position—causing him to suffer a grievous
loss—without a hearing, without providing a meaningful opportunity to be
heard, and without providing a statement of reasons.359 We must provide all
protections the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
afford. Due process demands holding a full fitness hearing to determine whether
the juvenile truly is beyond saving in the juvenile court system before transfer into
the adult court system.360 While requiring more fitness hearings would increase
administrative and fiscal burdens on the state, such increase is necessary to protect
both the juvenile’s and the public’s interest.361
The juvenile has a compelling interest in both an opportunity to rehabilitate
if amenable and avoiding the devastating consequences of being cast into the
adult criminal system.362 The juvenile’s personal interest aligns with the public’s
interests. No one would disagree that the public benefits more when juvenile
delinquents are reformed and guided into law-abiding adulthood, rather than
subjected to psychologically devastating adult correction centers where they will
either engage in self-destruction, or become even more hardened criminals.
The juvenile court system is far from ideal. As a result of the “get tough” era,
some juvenile courts are more geared towards punishment than rehabilitation.363
Some juvenile detention facilities are so worn down, overcrowded, or poorly run,
they look and feel no different than their adult counterparts. But despite these
deficiencies, the purpose at the heart of the juvenile court system in our society
remains rehabilitation; reaching out and intervening in the life of the juvenile
before he is beyond saving.364
Organizations constantly engage in research to discover how juvenile courts
can improve their rehabilitative services and facilities, and advocate to protect
the rights of juveniles in the juvenile courts.365 But for a juvenile transferred to
the adult criminal justice system, any progress towards greater rehabilitation in
the juvenile court system is nothing more than a “what could have been.” If
transferred under a scheme failing to provide him a fitness hearing, he has been
labeled incurable without an opportunity to be heard, without a statement of
reasons, without even so much as a single individual asking him, “why?”
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